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LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION V.
VELAZQUEZ: THE SUPREME COURT'S MISSED
OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY THE VIEWPOINT
DISCRIMINATION DOCTRINE'S ROLE IN
SUBSIDIZED SPEECH CASES
Jeffrey VanHooreweghe'
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech."'
These ten simple words, found in the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, restrict Congress absolutely from abridging the
freedom of speech.2  Despite this unqualified language, however, the
First Amendment's freedom of speech has long been recognized as not
absolute.3 Federal, state, and local governments consistently pass laws
limiting an individual's freedom to speak in order to fulfill policies
deemed to be in the public's interest.4 These limits test the boundaries of
the First Amendment's language, and the Supreme Court is continually
asked to clarify the meaning of this language, thereby setting the
parameters for this freedom.5
'J.D. Candidate, May 2001, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1022 (13th ed. 1997) (describing that "[a]s written, the First Amendment is simple and
unqualified"); cf U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress the power to "make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States").
3. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (noting that "the most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
theater and causing panic"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)
(stating that "there are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem," including obscenity, libel, and fighting words); Konigsberg v. State Bar of
California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (stating that "we reject the view that freedom of speech
and association [are] 'absolutes"').
4. See, e.g., supra note 3.
5. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1022 (noting that in the last eighty
years First Amendment claims have become "a staple of Court business and a source of
frequent controversy"). The Supreme Court's primary responsibility, as the highest court
in the nation, is to define the language in the First Amendment in order to set the
parameters of this freedom. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173, 177
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Challenges to free speech present the Court with some of the most
• 6
complex legal questions. The pressure to protect free speech as an
"indispensable condition" for all freedoms embodied in the Constitution
only exacerbates these questions.7 An underlying premise from which
the Court works when answering is that the freedom of speech should
facilitate a representative democracy by advancing truth in the
marketplace of ideas.8 Working under this premise, the Court justifiably
treats laws that restrict expressions of viewpoint as the "paradigm"
violation of the First Amendment. 9 The rationale is that by restricting
viewpoints, such laws create one-sided public debates and disrupt the
self-governing process.10
Yet, what if Congress funds one viewpoint at the exclusion of
(1803) (claiming that the "whole judicial power" rests with the Court and that: "It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to [s]ay what the law is.").
6. See infra notes 11-18 and accompanying text (describing the confusion associated
with free speech jurisprudence as applied in subsidized speech cases); see also GUNTHER
& SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1022 (noting that free speech rights are the source of
frequent controversy).
7. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937) (characterizing the freedom
of speech as a fundamental liberty because history recognizes it as the "indispensable
condition" of nearly every other form of freedom). Justice Brandeis can be credited with
placing this pressure on the Court when he stated:
[The founders] believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them,
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of
noxious doctrine ....
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374-75 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (analyzing the
First Amendment in order to set a standard of when it shall be sufficient to abridge the
freedom of speech).
8. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1.966) (noting that there is "practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964) (noting that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open," which may include sharp attacks on government and public officials); see also
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 7 (1970) (arguing that
freedom of expression "provides a framework in which the conflict necessary to the
progress of a society can take place without destroying the society").
9. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1204; see also Kingsley Int'l Pictures
Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959) ("[T]he First Amendment's basic guarantee is
of freedom to advocate ideas."). The Court presumes that viewpoint discriminating
restrictions are invalid. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 392 (1992)
(holding that the city of St. Paul could not prohibit a bigot's speech without also
prohibiting anti-bigot speech: "St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a
debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry
rules.").
10. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content:
The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978).
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another?" Should the Court hold such funding laws presumptively
invalid as viewpoint discriminating? 2 After all, if the government is not
constitutionally required to confer benefits,'3 why should the government
be limited in the conditions it places on such benefits? 4  More
specifically, how can a condition be struck down as discriminating on
viewpoint when the government is constitutionally permitted to fund
certain activities at the exclusion of others it feels are in the public's
interest? 5 These questions leave some of the brightest academics in
disarray 6 and some of the most intelligent judges befuddled. 7  The
11. Cf J. Dwight Yoder, Note, Justice or Injustice for the Poor?: A Look at the
Constitutionality of Congressional Restrictions on Legal Services, 6 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 827, 852 (1998) (arguing that "viewpoint discrimination appears constitutional...
when applied to private individuals acting as government agents in the political
marketplace").
12. See infra Part III (arguing that only in limited circumstances should a court strike
down funding restrictions under the viewpoint discrimination doctrine).
13. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554-55 (1987) (holding that the
government is not required to provide civil legal services for the indigent; the only right to
counsel is in first appeal in criminal matters); cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)
(refusing to require the government to provide abortion funding with government-funded
medical services).
14. See Megan Elizabeth Lewis, Note, Subsidized Speech and the Legal Services
Corporation: The Constitutionality of Defunding Constitutional Challenges to the Welfare
System, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1178, 1181 (1999) (recognizing the paradox in subsidized
speech and First Amendment jurisprudence in asking: "If the government is not
constitutionally obligated to provide a given subsidy, why should the First Amendment
constrain the restrictions placed on the use of the subsidy?"); see generally Robert L. Hale,
Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989).
15. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587-88 (1998)
("[A]lthough the First Amendment certainly has application in the subsidy context, we
note that the Government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that
would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake ....
Congress has wide latitude to set spending priorities.").
16. See Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free
Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543, 544 (1996) (noting that "[d]etermining the
constitutionality of government sub-sidization of expression is one of the most frustrating
tasks facing scholars of the First Amendment" and that "selective government
subsidization of expression implicates the First Amendment ultimately raises more
questions than it resolves"); see also Yoder, supra note 11, at 844 ("Discerning a coherent
analytical model for evaluating the constitutionality of congressional restrictions attached
to funding grants has become more difficult as the size and scope of government has
increased."); see generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH §§ 7:1 to 7-3 (1996) ("Devising intelligent constitutional principles to govern this
sort of indirect restriction on freedom of speech is one of the most challenging problems
facing any society committed to openness and free expression.").
17. See Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1402, 1411 (D.
Haw. 1997) ("The issue of subsidies/penalties and the First Amendment has bedeviled
courts for years. A primary reason for the confusion has been the doctrine of
'unconstitutional conditions"'); infra Part I.C (discussing Supreme Court's continued
2001]
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language of the First Amendment and the Court's precedent provide a
coherent analytical model for answering these questions. Application of
this model to subsidized speech cases leads to the conclusion that the
viewpoint discrimination doctrine's use in such cases must be reserved
for limited subsidized speech circumstances.' 8
The viewpoint discrimination doctrine recently caused confusion in the
Second and Ninth Circuits when these courts were asked to address the
constitutionality of various restrictions within the Legal Services
Corporation Act (LSCA or the Act). 9 The LSCA authorizes the Legal
Services Corporation (LSC) to distribute congressional funding to legal
service organizations.' °  Since the LSCA's inception, Congress has
restricted, and continually added restrictions to, this funding.' Congress
added the restrictions challenged before the Ninth and Second Circuits
with the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of
1996 (OCRAA).22
Although both circuits upheld most of the restrictions,23 the Second
Circuit, in applying the viewpoint discrimination doctrine, struck down a
provision within OCRAA as violating the First Amendment.24  This
vacillation in adopting the unconstitutional conditions doctrine). The courts vary their
analysis depending on the rights at issue in the case, which further complicates matters.
See Yoder, supra note 11, at 844-45 n.122 (citing to the many contexts in which
government may place conditions (e.g., land use, welfare) and arguing that government
may not place conditions on unemployment benefits, public school use, or government
employment).
18. See infra Part III.B.1 (suggesting that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is
generally the only analysis necessary in subsidized speech cases, unless the subsidy is for
the purpose of promoting diversity of speech); compare Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp.,
164 F.3d 757 (1999) (analyzing government funding restrictions specifically under the
viewpoint discrimination doctrine), affd, 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001), with Legal Aid Soc'y of
Hawaii v. Legal Servs. Corp., 145 F.3d 1017 (1998) (analyzing government funding
restrictions generally under an "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine).
19. Compare Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 771-72 (holding a narrow provision within the
government restrictions unconstitutional based on the viewpoint discrimination doctrine),
with Legal Aid Soc'y, 145 F.3d at 1029 (holding the same government restrictions in
general as constitutional under the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine); see also
generally Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996 et. seq. (1994) (as amended).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (providing funding "for the purpose of providing
financial support for legal assistance in noncriminal proceedings or matters to persons
financially unable to afford legal assistance"); see also supra Part I.D.1 (discussing the
LSCA's development).
21. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(d)(4) (prohibiting funding to advocate or oppose
ballot measures); §§ 2996f(b)(8)-(10) (prohibiting funding for, among other things,
criminal proceedings and desegregation and nontherapuetic abortion litigation).
22. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-134, § 504, 110 Stat. 1321-53 (1996).
23. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 772; LegalAid Soc'y, 145 F.3d at 1029.
24. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 772.
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provision was within the "suits-for-benefits" exception, which allowed
legal service organization grantees to represent clients seeking welfare
benefits as long as the grantee did not challenge existing welfare laws."
Specifically, the Second Circuit struck down the provision mandating
that representation could "not involve an effort to amend or otherwise
challenge existing law."26 In striking this essential provision, the Second
Circuit allowed the "suits-for-benefits" exception to engulf the rule and,
therefore, undermined the purpose of the LSCA." The Second Circuit
arrived at this fatal conclusion by misreading the subsidized speech
precedent and failing to apply an appropriate analytical framework."
Unfortunately, five Justices on the Supreme Court agreed with the
Second Circuit and affirmed its holding. 9 The Court left the Second
Circuit's ruling in tact, neglecting even to address the circuit court's order
to sever the narrow provision within the "suits-for-benefits" exception.0
In doing so, the Court allowed the LSC program to continue "under a
version of the statute Congress never enacted."31  This enables legal
service organization grantees to challenge existing welfare laws with LSC
funding, a consequence which undermines Congress's intention in
enacting the LSCA.32 Yet, this was not the least of the Court's errors. In
affirming the Second Circuit, the Court missed an opportunity to clarify
25. See id.; see also OCRAA § 504(a)(16), 110 Stat. at 1321-56. The "suits-for-
benefits" exception is embodied in the following restriction, which prohibits funding of
any organization:
[T]hat initiates legal representation or participates in any other way in litigation,
lobbying, or rulemaking, involving an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare
system, except that this paragraph shall not be construed to preclude a recipient
from representing an individual eligible client who is seeking specific relief from a
welfare agency if such relief does not involve an effort to amend or otherwise
challenge existing law in effect on the date of the initiation of the representation.
Id. (emphasis added to highlight the "suits-for-benefits" exception).
26. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 769-70. The Second Circuit decided to invalidate the
smallest possible portion of the statute, excising only the viewpoint based proviso rather
than the entire exception of which it is a part." Id. at 773.
27. The purpose of the LSCA is to provide "financial support for legal assistance in
noncriminal proceedings or matters to persons financially unable to afford legal
assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a). Striking the provision enables grantees to challenge
welfare laws, which is contrary to the express purpose of OCRAA § 504(a)(16). See infra
Part III.A.
28. See infra Part III.A (suggesting that grantees will now flood courts with welfare
litigation and possibly be encouraged to challenge other LSCA restrictions similar to the
"suits-for-benefits" exception, a result Congress feared and intended to prevent by
enacting LSCA).
29. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. 1043, 1046 (2001).
30. See id. at 1052-53.
31. Id. at 1053 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32. See supra note 25 and infra Part III.A.
2001]
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the viewpoint discrimination doctrine's role in subsidized speech cases.33
This will only prolong the confusion among lower courts and result in
further disruptions to congressionally-funded programs.
This Comment proposes an analytical model for subsidized speech
cases and illustrates its coherency by analyzing the LSCA's "suits-for-
benefits" exception. This Comment is not an exhaustive analysis of First
Amendment jurisprudence or subsidized speech case law. Rather, this
Comment argues that the language of the First Amendment and case law
provide a basis for this model. Part I examines the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine and the viewpoint discrimination analyses. Part I
also discusses the subsidized speech case law and the Second and Ninth
Circuits' use of this case law. Part II analyzes the Second and Ninth
Circuits' recent attempts to adjudicate First Amendment challenges to
the LSCA's restrictions. Part II highlights why lower courts need a more
coherent analytical model to address such issues. Part II briefly discusses
the Supreme Court's recent Velazquez decision, only to note the Court's
failure to provide the needed clarification and establish an analytical
framework. Part III proposes the analytical model under which the
LSCA restrictions should have been analyzed and concludes that all the
restrictions should have been upheld. Finally, this Comment concludes
that the viewpoint discrimination doctrine is applied too liberally in
subsidized speech cases and, consequently, is diluting Congress's efforts
to fund social programs.
I. ADDRESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING
CONDITIONS ON SPEECH
When the government sets conditions on benefits, the question arises
as to whether such conditions, having the power of law, violate the
Constitution.3" The government's ability to set restrictions on benefits is
restrained by an underlying principle that government benefits may not
be conditioned on relinquishing First Amendment rights.35 The Supreme
33. Cf. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. at 1053 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Court
"applies a novel and unsupportable interpretation of our public forum precedent to
declare § 504(a)(16) facially unconstitutional. This holding not only has no foundation in
our jurisprudence; it is flatly contradicted by a recent decision that is on all fours with the
present case.").
34. See Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39
STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1120 (1987) ("The general question is whether the power of
government.., to deny a privilege includes the power to grant it on any terms, including
the surrender of an otherwise applicable constitutional right.").
35. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 514-15, 526 (1958) (overturning a California
law requiring veterans to declare that they would not advocate for an overthrow of
government to receive a property tax exemption).
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Court has experimented primarily with two doctrines to apply this
principle and test whether the condition is constitutional: (1) the rights-
privilege doctrine; and (2) the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.36
A. The Triumph of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine:
Determining Whether the Condition Is a Penalty or Non-Subsidy
Prior to employing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to
determine whether conditions on benefits are constitutional, the
Supreme Court endorsed the rights-privilege doctrine.37 This doctrine
made a simple distinction between rights, which the Constitution
guarantees to citizens,38 and privileges, which are distributed at the
government's discretion.39 Rights deserve special protection and cannot
be infringed upon by the government without justification under strict,
intermediate, or minimum scrutiny.40 Government funding restrictions
do not infringe rights; rather, the restrictions are viewed as terms in a
contract between the grantee and the government.41 The Supreme Court
soon realized, however, that with the increasing number of conditions set
on government spending, there was great opportunity for government
tyrannical control under the rights-privilege doctrine. 42 As a result, the
Court gradually ended its application.
36. See Yoder, supra note 11, at 845 (discussing both doctrines and noting that the
Court "has relied on [these] two competing doctrines in reviewing the constitutionality of
restrictions placed on government-financed programs").
37. See id. at 847.
38. See generally U.S. CONST. amends. I-X (Bill of Rights); see also Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (recognizing the right for unmarried persons to purchase
contraceptives); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing the right to marry
freely); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (recognizing a fundamental
right to privacy in the "penumbra" of specific guarantees in the first ten amendments);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (recognizing the right to procreate).
39. See, e.g., The Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996b-1 (1994)
(granting federal funding to legal service organizations for servicing indigent clients).
40. See generally Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue
Burden Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867 (1994) (explaining the
different levels of scrutiny).
41. Cf. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (Mass. 1892)
(highlighting the distinction between rights and privileges and holding privilege conditions
as implied terms of a contract). In McAuliffe, the court held that the government does not
violate the First Amendment when it fires a police officer for making a political speech.
Id. at 517. Justice Holmes, writing for the court, summed up the Court's rationale and the
rights-privilege doctrine by stating, "[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no right to be a policeman." Id.
42. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1442-58 (1968).
43. See id.
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The unconstitutional conditions doctrine developed as the Court
realized that by setting restrictions on funding, the government could, in
essence, penalize a citizen for exercising his or her constitutional rights." 44
It is not logical, the Court rationalized, to allow the government to
accomplish something indirectly that it could not do directly. 5 The Court
sought to prevent the government from leveraging its subsidy power to
prevent recipients from engaging in constitutionally-permissible
privately-funded activities.46 With free speech challenges, the Court
will ask whether the condition on the subsidy operates as a penalty on
speech or as a non-subsidy.47 In the former, the Court tests the
44. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (noting that "[tlo deny an
exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them
for such speech").
45. See id. at 526.
46. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (holding that the government
"may not deny a benefit ... on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech"); see also GUNTHER & SULLIVAN,
supra note 2, at 1318.
47. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1318-19. The distinction drawn
between conditions acting as a penalty on speech and those acting as mere subsidies is
similar to other distinctions in First Amendment jurisprudence. See id. Such distinctions
fall within the context of public forums, public education, and public employment. See id.
In the public forum context, restrictions on the use of traditional public forums intended
for expression is subject to a higher scrutiny than those not intended for expression. See
Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) ("The privilege.., to use
the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated
in the interest of all ... but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.");
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800-02 (1985) (finding
that government limits imposed on certain charity organizations for participation in a
charity fund drive is not regulation of a public forum, but noting that the extent of
regulation allowed depends on the "nature of the relevant forum"); see also Lewis, supra
note 14, at 1204-09 (arguing that the LSCA welfare reform exceptions create a traditional
public forum and any restriction on speech is impermissible); cf. Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1983) (holding that teacher mailboxes
are not traditional public forums; thus, the access restrictions did not constitute
impermissible content discrimination).
In the public employment context, the Court distinguishes between employee
speech and citizen speech when deciding whether restrictions on employee speech are
constitutional. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (finding that a
school teacher cannot be dismissed from his job for writing a letter to a newspaper for
criticizing the school board's handling of revenue). The Pickering Court reasoned that the
First Amendment protects teacher speech when speaking as a member of the public and
not as a public employee. Id. Thus, when the restriction on speech defines the scope of an
individual's employment, the First Amendment provides little protection; however, when
the restriction carries over to limit the individual's right to speak, which he otherwise
would enjoy as a citizen, the First Amendment protection is heightened. See Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (holding that an employee who commented on the
1981 assassination attempt on President Reagan did not interfere with the "effective
functioning of the public employer's enterprise" and was protected); Connick v. Myers,
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restrictions under strict or intermediate scrutiny, whereas in the latter,
the Court employs a minimal scrutiny standard.48
B. The Viewpoint Discrimination Doctrine in Subsidized Speech Cases:
Entertaining the Argument
When Congress places conditions on benefits, the Court entertains the
argument that the conditions abridge free speech because they
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.49 In Regan v. Taxation With
Representation,° the Court suggested that the government may not
"discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to 'aim at the
suppression of dangerous ideas.' 51 For the most part, the viewpoint
discrimination doctrine finds limited success in striking funding
conditions. The Court in Rust v. Sullivan53 explained this failure in
461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (holding that an employee's questionnaire could disrupt the
office, undermine authority, and destroy working relations enough to justify the
employee's dismissal).
48. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1319; see also Van Alstyne, supra
note 42, at 1442-58.
49. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (arguing how viewpoint discrimination
necessarily adds protection where the unconstitutional conditions doctrine fails to do so in
subsidized speech cases). But see infra Part III (arguing that the application of the
viewpoint discrimination doctrine should add protection only in limited circumstances).
The viewpoint discrimination doctrine's use may be found in a number of Supreme Court
decisions. See, e.g., Kingsley v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-90 (1959) (holding that a state
may not deny a license to a film solely because the film advocates an idea with which the
state may not agree); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (stating that
"mere advocacy" of violent overthrow of democracy could not be criminalized); R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 484 U.S.
961, 980 (1987) (invalidating an anti-pornography ordinance as "thought control" and
noting that "[s]peech that 'subordinates' women ... is forbidden .... [while] [s]peech that
portrays women in positions of equality is lawful, no matter how graphic the sexual
content"); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510-11, 514
(1969) (holding a public school's punishment of children wearing black armbands in
opposition to the Vietnam War unconstitutional because it sought to suppress one
particular viewpoint).
50. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
51. Id. at 548 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)
(quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)). Yet, the Regan Court went on to
uphold a federal law banning tax exemptions for charity organizations involved in
lobbying despite Congress's ability to exempt some organizations. Id. at 548-49 (allowing
exemptions of veteran organizations "regardless of the content of any speech they may
use").
52. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S.Ct. 1043, 1054 (2001) (Scalia, J.
dissenting) (noting that the Court has found funding conditions unconstitutional only once
in Rosenberger v. Rector). See also infra Part I.C. But see Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S.
819, 829 (1995) (holding a restriction on funding for Christian publications as viewpoint
discrimination); Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 771-72 (1999), cert. granted
120 S. Ct. 1553 (2000) (holding the "suits-for-benefits" exception as unconstitutional
20011
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stating: "To hold that the Government unconstitutionally discriminates
on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to
advance certain permissible goals, because the program in advancing
those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals, would render
numerous Government programs constitutionally suspect. 54 Yet, with
subsequent subsidized speech cases continuing to entertain the viewpoint
discrimination argument, litigants will continue to bring claims that
funding restrictions violate the First Amendment by discriminating on
the basis of viewpoint."
C. The Seminal Cases in Subsidized Speech: Harmonizing Linguistic
Differences To Develop an Analytical Model for Determining when
Funding Conditions "Abridge" the Freedom of Speech
1. Foundations of a Model: Regan Hesitates To Adopt the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine and Suggests an "Unduly
Burdensome" Standard
In Regan v. Taxation With Representation,56 the nonprofit organization
TWR sued the United States Treasury Department after the Department
denied the organization tax-exempt status. 7 The Internal Revenue Code
section 501(c)(3) 8 allowed public interest and charity organizations to
claim a tax exemption, but prohibited organizations engaged in
substantial lobbying from receiving this benefit. 9 TWR organized to
promote the public's viewpoint on matters relating to federal taxation.60
The Supreme Court first classified the tax exemption as a form of
subsidy, which is similar, though not equivalent, to a cash grant.6' In
viewpoint discrimination).
53. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
54. Id. at 194.
55. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 767. But see generally National Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 590-600 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that only when
the government promotes the marketplace of ideas should funding restrictions be
analyzed under the strict viewpoint discrimination doctrine); infra Part III (agreeing with
Justice Scalia and arguing further that precedent supports the application of the viewpoint
discrimination analysis to the limited circumstances where the purpose of the spending is
to create a public forum for the expression of ideas).
56. 461 U.S. 540 (1983)
57. See id. at 542.
58. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
59. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 542.
60. See id. at 541-42. TWR formed to take over two other nonprofit organizations:
one received tax-exempt status and the other did not. See id. at 543.
61. See id. at 544.
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analyzing the restrictions placed on the subsidy, Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, noted that TWR could continue to receive the
benefit if it operated under a dual structure, keeping the lobbying
department separate from the charity department. 2  Under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Court recognized that the
constitutionality of the restrictions turned on whether forcing this dual
structure burdened TWR to such an extent that it was "penalized" for its
lobbying.63
Yet, Justice Rehnquist lifted the rights-privilege doctrine from its
demise to avoid the issue and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
64
Because the statute did not deny TWR a right to receive support for its
non-lobbying activities, but merely refused to fund lobbying, the Court
upheld the statute.6' This tax provision merely represented Congress's
choice to confer a benefit for one activity at the exclusion of another.66
On the other hand, Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion,
addressed the unconstitutional conditions question and analyzed the
manner in which the IRS administered section 501.67 According to
Blackmun, the tax-exempt provision alone violated the doctrine's
62. See id. TWR had used this separation in the past without being unduly burdened.
See id.
63. See id. at 545. TWR argued that the tax statute acted as a prohibition against
substantial lobbying and, under Speiser v. Randall, penalized the organization for its
speech. See id. In reply, the Court upheld the proposition that the government is not
entitled to "deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right." Id.
(citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
64. See id.
65. See id. at 546 (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), for the
proposition that the First Amendment does not require Congress to subsidize lobbying).
66. See id. at 548. In dictum, the Court hinted at the possible use of the viewpoint
discrimination doctrine in subsidized speech cases by stating that "[t]he case would be
different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to
'ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas."' Id. at 548 (citing Cammarano, 358 U.S. at
513). The Court conceded that if such a case were to arise, a strict scrutiny analysis would
apply; however, the Court carefully noted that this was not such a case. See id. The Court
explained that holding otherwise would require this strict standard whenever Congress
chose to subsidize some speech but not all. See id. (supplying no reason why this was not
such a case).
In explaining that the decision to subsidize one activity over another is a matter of
congressional discretion, the Court cited the proposition that "although government may
not place obstacles in the path of a [person's] exercise of ... freedom of [speech], it need
not remove those not of its own creation." Id. at 549-50 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 316 (1980)). Therefore, the Court used the rational basis standard and held that it was
not irrational for Congress to decide that a tax exemption should not be allowed for
organizations such as TWR, as it was a concern that nonprofit organizations would lobby
for their own private interests. See id. at 550.
67. See id. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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principle that the government may not deny a benefit because one
exercises a constitutional right." The Tax Code's other provisions,
however, enabled the government to avoid the First Amendment
violation by allowing an affiliate organization to incorporate separately
and keep records that show that the subsidies will not be used for
lobbying.69
2. Developing the Model: L WV Accepts Blackmun's Concurrence and
Exemplifies the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine's Ability To Strike
Funding Conditions Under the First Amendment
In FCC v. League of Women Voters 7 educational broadcasting
stations challenged the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 (the Act) under
the free speech clause.7' This Act established the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting to disburse federal funds to support educational
programming." The section at issue prohibited an educational
broadcaster to "engage in editorializing., 73  Ultimately, the Court held
this section of the Act unconstitutional because it abridged the freedom
of speech that broadcasters should enjoy.4
After noting that the speech at issue traditionally enjoys higher
protection,75  the Court addressed the unconstitutional conditions
68. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that the provision deprives an
otherwise eligible organization to receive the benefit whenever one of its activities is
substantial lobbying).
69. See id. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
70. 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (LWV)
71. See id. at 366.
72. See id. The corporation was established to combat the under-financing, which
plagued the educational (non-commercial) stations, so that the educational broadcaster
could "realize its full potential as a true alternative to commercial broadcasting." Id. at
368.
73. Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 47 U.S.C. § 399(a) (1981) (repealed 1988);
Regan, 461 U.S. at 366.
74. See LWV, 468 U.S. at 402.
75. Before reaching the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Court offered a
lengthy discussion as to why this speech deserves protection under a higher standard. See
id. at 375-399. The Court began by noting that the section squarely restricts the expression
of editorial opinion on matters of public importance, which usually deserve the most
exacting scrutiny. See id. at 375. The Court also recognized, however, that because of the
scarcity of spectrum, radio broadcasting is a unique medium and that different First
Amendment standards should apply. See id. at 377 (citing Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973)). Through regulation, Congress is
allowed to ensure that the public receives a balance of views on issues of public
importance. See id. at 376-77. Thus, broadcasters possess a duty to represent the views of
their community, as Congress intended, through a broadcast license. See id. at 377.
On the other hand, the broadcaster is "entitled under the First Amendment to
'the widest journalistic freedom consistent with their public [duties]."' Id. at 378 (citing
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question.76 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan quickly dismissed the
Regan analogy and the possibility that this was a mere non-subsidy
because, unlike under the Tax Code, a separate affiliate could not be
easily established.77 The grantee was not able to segregate its activities
according to the source of its funding and, thus, the Court concluded that
the restriction acted as a complete abridgment to the freedom to
editorialize. 8 Ultimately, the Court deemed the funding restriction
unconstitutional because no adequate channels existed for the grantees
to express their views.79
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981)). Realizing this freedom, the
Court analyzed the restriction under an intermediate scrutiny standard requiring it to be
narrowly tailored to further a substantial government interest. See id. at 380. The
Government argued that the prohibition on editorializing was necessary to protect the
stations from being coerced by the government or private groups wishing to express their
own views. See id. at 384-85. The restriction on editorializing, however, proved over and
under-inclusive to reach this end, and thus, the intermediate standard was not met. See id.
at 398-99.
76. See LWV, 468 U.S. at 399. The Court needed to address whether the funding
restriction was an unconstitutional condition after the Government argued that, under
Regan, the restriction was justified under the government's power to set restrictions on the
federal funds it disburses. See id.
77. See id. at 400.
78. See id. (noting that the government provided for only one percent of the grantees'
funding).
79. See id. As the author of the Regan opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented and
offered the position that the Court's lengthy opinion set the stage against the Government
when it finally presented the government funding argument. See id. at 402-03 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court presents the government as the "Big Bad Wolf'
who cruelly forbids the broadcaster, "Little Red Riding Hood," from taking some food "to
her grandmother"). Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court presented the
government as a "bad guy" who takes away a broadcaster's right to free speech, when in
reality the government is the one who gives the broadcasters the opportunity to speak. Id.
at 403 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In doing so, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued, the
government is entitled to set conditions on the benefit it offered and the broadcaster
accepted. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stressing the contractual relationship the
federal funding to public broadcasters established). To support this contention, Chief
Justice Rehnquist presented the educational broadcasting station as a limited public forum
that Congress created to provide educational programs that commercial broadcasters are
normally unwilling to furnish. See id. at 404 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Similar to his opinion in Regan, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the restriction
is subject to a minimal rational relation test. See id. at 405 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Rehnquist looked to Regan for the proposition that Congress's "decision"
not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe upon that right, and
in "deciding" to subsidize one speech over another, congressional action is not subject to
strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at 405 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Unlike the majority's
suggestion, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that Regan is not distinguishable on the fact
that the federal funding is inseparable and provides only one percent of the total funding,
thus acting as a total bar. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist
analogized the restrictions here with the Hatch Act restrictions, which prohibit local or
state employees who receive even partial financing from the federal government from
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3. The Viewpoint Discrimination Doctrine's Limited Role in the Modelb
Rust Exemplifies the Doctrine's Inability To Strike Funding Conditions
and Clarifies the Unconstitutional Conditions Analysis
In Rust v. Sullivan,"' the recipients of federal funds for family planning
organizations challenged the Department of Public Health's funding
restrictions.8' The restrictions prohibited the organizations from
advocating abortion as a method of family planning and compelled them
to advocate continued pregnancy.82 The recipients therefore argued that
the restrictions violated the First Amendment by impermissibly
discriminating against the viewpoint that abortion is a method of family
planning."' Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, rejected this
argument and upheld the restriction as constitutional 4 Central to the
Court's holding was its categorization of the restrictions as Congress's
means of fulfilling the purpose for which the funds were provided.85 If
participating in any political activities. See id. at 406 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting
that the Court upheld the Hatch Act under a First Amendment claim in Oklahoma v.
CSC, 330 U.S. 127 (1947)). The inability to compartmentalize the broadcaster's expenses
makes the amount of the subsidy trivial. See id. at 407 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(noting that the only way to ensure the federal funds are not used to subsidize
editorializing is through this restriction). Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the
prohibition is "plainly rational" to prevent the government from endorsing a particular
view. Id. at 407 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). It does not follow that only one view is
discriminated against or that the station managers cannot use other means to express their
views. See id. at 408 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). To support his position, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that it is Congress's decision as to what the taxpayer's want to fund. See
id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, "unconstitutional
condition cases" arise when no content-neutral condition exists and that it is difficult to
argue that the subsidy goes to dangerous speech. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
80. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
81. See id. at 178.
82. See id. (noting that the restriction prohibits all discussion about abortion as a
lawful option, including counseling, referral, and the provision of neutral and accurate
information about ending a pregnancy).
83. See id. at 192 (arguing under both the unconstitutional conditions and viewpoint
discrimination doctrines that such restrictions penalize speech and invidiously discriminate
against viewpoints); see also Lewis, supra note 14, at 1188 (arguing that the Title X
regulations clearly favored family planning without abortion while rejecting an alternative
view that abortion is an acceptable method of family planning).
84. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 192 (upholding the restrictions by citing Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977), which rejected the same argument involving recipients who could receive
money for services related to childbirth but not for non-therapeutic abortions). The
Maher Court stated that: "The government may make a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement that judgment by the allocation of public
funds." Id. at 192-93 (citing Maher, 432 U.S. at 474). In selecting to fund one activity, the
government is not discriminating against viewpoints, it is just choosing one activity over
the other. See id. at 193 (arguing that there is a difference between direct interference
with a protected activity and state encouragement of another activity).
85. See id. at 193. The Court viewed the funds' purpose as providing family planning
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the viewpoint discrimination doctrine may be used to strike down these
means, then the purpose of many government programs would never be
fulfilled.8'
In light of this observation, Chief Justice Rehnquist finally adopted the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and asked whether the restriction,
by forcing the grantees to give up their freedom to counsel about
abortion, acted as a penalty." In answering this question, Chief Justice
Rehnquist clarified the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.m The Court
stated that unconstitutional conditions arise when there is a condition on
the recipient of the subsidy, which prevents the recipient from engaging
in the conduct outside the scope of the program, not when the condition
is on the particular program. 9 Looking at the facts of Rust, Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that because the grantee was still entitled to advocate
abortion-separately and distinctly from the federal program-the
restriction did not act as a penalty and force an unconstitutional
condition."'
The Court qualified this holding for future subsidized speech cases by
stating that just because the government allows the recipient to speak
outside the scope of the program does not mean that restrictions
and not prenatal care. See id. Thus, advocating abortion was outside the scope and
purpose of the funded program. See id. To support this argument, the Court noted that
the government has a right to use taxpayer money as it sees fit. See id. at 194 (arguing that
in setting up a program, the government is entitled to set the limits).
86. See id. ("To hold that the Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the
basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to advance certain
permissible goals, . . . [by] necessarily discourag[ing] alternative goals, would render
numerous Government programs constitutionally suspect.").
87. See id. at 194-96.
88. See id. at 197.
89. See id. (citing to L WV and noting that Congress had explicitly set up an
alternative channel for the grantees to engage in abortion related activities under statute
consistent with the Court's opinions).
90. See id. at 196. Blackmun's vigorous dissent classified the restrictions as viewpoint
discrimination and suggested that the majority had never upheld such a condition on the
acceptance of public funds. See id. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (dismissing the
Court's argument that the program was family planning and not pre-natal care). In
support of this, the dissent distinguished Regan as upholding a content-neutral restriction
and cited Regan's dictum that the case would be different if Congress had "ai[med] at the
suppression of dangerous ideas." Id. at 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the
dissent argued that the abortion-counseling restriction was clearly content-based and
viewpoint discrimination when it compelled anti-abortion speech in favor of abortion
advocacy. See id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent argued that the
restrictions manipulate the content of a doctor's speech in such a way that the doctor
becomes an instrument of an ideological point of view. See id. at 211 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). This classification places the case in the context of setting conditions on
public employment. The dissent argued that conditioning one's free speech right in return
for public employment is unconstitutional. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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controlling the content, of the expression within the program are
justifiable. 9' Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that if the government
funded a traditional "all-encompassing" doctor-patient relationship and
placed restrictions on what could be discussed, the restrictions could be
struck down under the viewpoint discrimination doctrine.9 However, in
this case, the government funded limited health services and did not
intend to establish such an "all-encompassing" relationship where the
doctor is allowed to speak freely. 93 Thus, the viewpoint discrimination
doctrine did not apply.94
4. Completing the Model: Rosenberger Feeds Off Rehnquist's
Language and Establishes the Exception to Not Using the Viewpoint
Discrimination Doctrine To Invalidate Funding Restrictions
At issue in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia5 was whether the University of Virginia's (UVA) refusal to
fund a Christian student newspaper violated the First Amendment's free
speech clause.96  Wide Awake Productions (WAP), the student
organization that published the newspaper, offered a Christian
perspective on social and community issues at UVA.97 The Supreme
Court held that the denial of funding amounted to viewpoint
discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.98
First, the Court stated that the fundamental principle of the viewpoint
discrimination doctrine is that the government may not regulate speech
based on its substantive content or message.9 The First Amendment
91. See id. at 199 (noting that when the benefit is government owned property, i.e,.
public parks traditionally dedicated to facilitate speech activity, universities, or traditional
doctor-patient relationships, then the recipient of the benefit should enjoy protection).
92. Id. at 200 (explaining that if the patient justifiably expects comprehensive medical
advice and reasonably expects that the advice comes from the doctor himself, then the
restrictions could be struck).
93. Id. (noting that the patients do not expect freedom of counseling and should be
on notice of the program's scope because the doctor is always free to tell the patient that
abortion counseling is beyond the scope of the program).
94. See id.; cf. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995) (expounding this qualification and applying the viewpoint discrimination doctrine
when the government intends to establish a "forum" for free expression).
95. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
96. See id. at 822-23, 845-46 (explaining that UVA financed the publication costs of
all other student-run papers and journals, but argued that the University could not fund a
paper that primarily promoted a particular belief about a deity without violating the
Establishment Clause).
97. See id. at 826-27 (explaining that WAP qualified for funding under the university
standards, but was refused solely because it was a "religious activity").
98. See id. at 837.
99. See id. at 828 (stating that in private speech, the government may not favor one
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violation is even more blatant, and presumed unconstitutional, when the
government targets views to regulate."' The Court extended these
principles to situations where Congress establishes a public forum for the
purpose of encouraging a diversity of views.' ' Even though Congress
may limit the forum's scope, it must respect its boundaries and not
discriminate based on viewpoint.' 2 In light of these principles, the Court
found that the UVA Student Funding Program was a limited public
forum.' 3 The majority therefore concluded that because the restriction
disfavored editorials with a Christian perspective, as opposed to
excluding all editorials with a religious association, it crossed the forum's
boundaries and regulated speech unconstitutionally. °4
5. Applying the Model Under Different Guises: Finley
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley °5 involved federal funding
for artistic endeavors.'" Congress restricted funding to those applicants
speaker over another) (citing Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972);
Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804
(1984); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994)).
100. See id. at 829.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 829-30 (stating that when the government creates a public forum and
sets restrictions on it, the test of permissibility is whether the government acted to
preserve the limits of the forum or directed against speech otherwise within the forum's
limitation).
103. See id. at 830-31.
104. See id. at 831-32 (dismissing the dissent's argument that viewpoint discrimination
was not present because the restriction excluded several religious or non-religious views
with the rebuttal that a theist or atheist will offer a different view than one speaking solely
on political or economic beliefs); see also generally Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). Regan is distinguishable from Rust because
here, the government created a program to encourage speech, and in Rust, the
government used the recipients to relay the government's message. See Rosenberger, 515
U.S. at 834. This distinction and the acknowledgment that the University is a promoter of
speech allowed the Court, in its view, to remain consistent with Rust's holding and dictum.
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,200 (1991).
Although the dissent disagreed primarily with the Court on whether the funding
violated the Establishment Clause, the dissent addressed the free speech claim at issue.
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 892-93 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent would have
applied a broader reading of the viewpoint discrimination doctrine that encompassed
situations where the government allows one message at the exclusion of the speaker's
competitors. See id. at 894-95 (Souter, J., dissenting). Yet, in analyzing the case at hand,
the dissent did not find viewpoint discrimination because the restriction was aimed at all
religious viewpoints, and did not favor one religious view over another. See id at 895-96
(Souter, J., dissenting).
105. 524 U.S. 569 (1998)
106. See id. at 573. The National Endowment on the Arts and Humanties Act of 1965,
20 U.S.C. § 951(7) (1994), provides federal funds to encourage freedom of thought and
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whose work comported with "general standards of decency," while
respecting the diversity of beliefs and values in society.'O The plaintiffs
argued that such restrictions violated their First Amendment right of free
speech.0 8 At the appellate level, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that the restriction violated the First Amendment
by impermissibly discriminating on the basis of viewpoint."" Analogizing
the facts to Rosenberger, the Ninth Circuit applied the viewpoint
discrimination doctrine because the purpose of the congressional
program was to encourage diversity of private expression."" The
Supreme Court reversed this decision."'
a. Justice O'Connor Avoids the Viewpoint Discrimination Doctrine
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor avoided the viewpoint
discrimination doctrine by interpreting the statute to require thepanel to
take decency and respect into consideration, not as exclusive factors on
which to preclude expression. " ' Justice O'Connor found the
Rosenberger analogy misplaced."3 It is inevitable that placing restrictions
on art funding will be subjective; thus, Justice O'Connor argued that it
was impossible for Congress to establish a public forum for the diversity
of views indiscriminately."4  The scarcity of funds mandated that
Congress fund certain artists at the exclusion of others."5 Accordingly,
release of creativity. See 20 U.S.C. § 951(7).
107. Finley, 524 U.S. at 572 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1)).
108. See id. at 577.
109. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 100 F.3d 671, 681-82 (9th Cir.
1996), rev'd by, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998).
110. See id. at 682-83 (applying the strict scrutiny standard). The Ninth Circuit also
cited Rust in explaining that government funding for arts is a "traditional sphere of free
expression" deserving different treatment. Id. 681-82 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
200 (1991)). In contrast, the dissent applied Rosenberger and argued that the First
Amendment does not require the Government to fund speech that to them is indecent and
disrespectful. See id. at 684, 686, 689 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting); see also National
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 112 F.3d 1015, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd by, 524
U.S. 569, 580 (1998) (O'Scannlan, J., dissenting) (rejecting a denial of rehearing en banc).
111. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 580.
112. See id. at 581-82. In essence, Justice O'Connor distinguished this case from past
viewpoint discrimination cases as bearing a less evident and substantial discrimination.
See id. at 582 (comparing the present case to R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992),
which invalidated a municipal ordinance that made it criminal to place a symbol on
property that "one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender").
113. See id. at 586.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 585-86 (comparing this to Rosenberger, where certain funding was
available to all student organizations, and Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 386 (1993), which made a public school auditorium available to
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Justice O'Connor found that if the program could not fund a forum for
all artistic expressions, and the program's intention was to fund a
selective group, its restrictions could not penalize a disfavored
viewpoint."
6
b. Justice Scalia Articulates the Model
Justice Scalia agreed with the Court's conclusion, but sharply criticized
Justice O'Connor's reasoning."7 Justice Scalia read the statute literally
as establishing viewpoint-based criteria for awarding applications."'
After admitting that the statute was viewpoint based, Justice Scalia
argued that viewpoint discriminating statutes are not unconstitutional in
the congressional funding context." 9 Justice Scalia proposed that unless
the statute's purpose is to establish a forum for expressing diverse views,
the viewpoint discrimination doctrine is not applicable .
In looking at the First Amendment's language, Justice Scalia noted
that to "abridge" speech requires a showing that speech is contracted,
diminished, or deprived. 2' In the government-funding context, this
showing is difficult because denying a subsidy will generally not
"infringe" a right or have a "coercive effect."'' 22  Thus, Justice Scalia
found it "preposterous to equate the denial of taxpayer subsidy with the
measures 'aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.",1
23
the entire public).
116. See id. at 586-87 (noting that the government may not aim at the suppression of
ideas and "fi]f the [National Endowment for the Arts] were to leverage its power to award
subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints, then
we would confront a different case").
117. See id. at 590 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("'The operation was a success, but the
patient died.' What such a procedure is to medicine, the Court's opinion in this case is to
law.").
118. See id. at 592-93 (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding that the National Endowment for
the Arts statute awards the applicant that displays decency and respect for the diverse
beliefs and values of the American people over the applicant that does not).
119. See id. at 593 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated that: "The law at issue
in this case ... passed both Houses and was signed by the President .... And that law
unquestionably disfavors-discriminates against-indecency and disrespect for the diverse
beliefs and values of the American people. I turn, then, to whether such viewpoint
discrimination violates the Constitution." Id. at 595 (Scalia, J., concurring).
120. See id. at 598-99 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Rosenberger for this proposition).
121. Id. at 595 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting the First Amendment and emphasizing
the term "abridge").
122. Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., concurring).
123. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Rosenberger and noting that those who wish to
create indecent and disrespectful art are as unconstrained now as they were before).
Justice Scalia recognizes the argument that the threat of rejection of government funds
based on one's viewpoint, when the government funding is the only source of funding (or
is tied to the only source of funding), could be coercive and thus, an abridgment of one's
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Turning to prior subsidized speech cases to support his position,
Justice Scalia cited Rust for the proposition that the government is
allowed to fund one activity it regards as being in the public's interest
over an alternative activity.'24  Recognizing that the nature and
responsibility of a democratic government makes every funding statute
viewpoint discriminating, Justice Scalia reasoned that the
constitutionality turns on whether the statute coerces one to give up a
fundamental right."' Justice Scalia justified Rosenberger's holding as a
case in which the government established a limited public forum.
126
Because such was not the case here, Justice Scalia concluded that the
government is entitled to fund "ad libitum, insofar as the First
Amendment is concerned.'
127
D. Two Circuit Courts Attempt To Apply This Case Law to the Legal
Services Corporation Act
1. The Act: A History of Ideological Conflict
President Richard Nixon signed the Legal Services Corporation Act
(LSCA) 28 into law on July 25, 1974.129 The Nixon Administration sought
to establish a politically independent, yet congressionally funded,
nonprofit corporation to provide financial support for legal services for
indigent clients throughout the nation.3  President Nixon sought
political independence for the corporation in order to alleviate the
ideological conflict proving ruinous in past efforts at providing legal
free speech right. See id. at 596-97 (Scalia, J., concurring). In the present case, however,
this argument does not apply because additional sources of funding this art existed. See id.
at 597 (Scalia, J., concurring).
124. See id. at 597 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia correctly points out that every
funding legislation is discriminatory and exemplifies that the statute used to create the
NEA requires funding for artistic expression over scientific or theological expression. See
id. (Scalia, J., concurring). This is the point of a democratic system. See id. at 597-98
(Scalia, J., concurring).
125. See id. at 598-99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
126. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Note that Justice Scalia refused to recognize that
the exception to the general rule that viewpoint discrimination is inapplicable in the
government funding context is a matter of whether the government is speaking or funding
private speech. See id. at 599. (Scalia, J., concurring). Rather, the exception is limited to
those situations where the government establishes a limited public forum as was the case
in Rosenberger. See id. at 598-99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
127. Finley, 524 U.S. at 598-99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996a-1 (1994) (as amended).
129. See id.; see also Yoder, supra note 11, at 832.
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a); see also Yoder, supra note 11, at 832.
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services to those in need.'31
The expressed purpose of the LSCA was to "provid[e] financial
support for legal assistance in noncriminal proceedings or matters to
persons financially unable to afford legal assistance.' 3 2  The Act
attempts "to provide equal access to the system of justice," in order to
improve the opportunities available to low-income individuals.'33
However, the LSCA in no way creates a right to legal services.' Rather,
the Legal Services Corporation (LSC or Corporation) administers grant
privileges to hundreds of local organizations that provide legal services to
one to two million indigent clients annually.' 5 Most of these local
organizations receive both LSC and private funding.'36 Yet, once an
organization receives LSC funds, it must adhere to both the
Corporation's and Congress's regulations."' Since the inception of the
LSCA, restrictions have been placed on LSC funding, 8 and the
131. See Yoder, supra note 11, at 832-33. In 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson's war
on poverty established a legal service program in the Office of Economic Opportunity
(OEO), which targeted urban areas for legal aid funding. See id. at 833; see generally
Stephen K. Huber, Thou Shalt Not Ration Justice: A History and Bibliography of Legal
Aid in America, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754 (1976). Both conservatives and liberals
attacked the program; the former arguing that it is another intervening law reform and the
latter arguing that it is just a service function. See Yoder, supra note 11, at 833; see also
Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323, 327-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing the
LSCA's history of controversy). In the 1970's, it was alleged that President Nixon
attempted to completely destroy the OEO, but after failing, compromised and signed into
law the LSCA, which contained narrow restrictions and provided limited funding. See
Yoder, supra note 11, at 833.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a); see also Grassley v. Legal Servs. Corp., 535 F. Supp. 818, 823
(S.D. Iowa 1982) (holding that Congress intended the LSCA to benefit indigents with
legal grievances but who are unable to afford legal means necessary to redress them; not
to protect its members from anything).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2996(1), (3) (statement of purpose).
134. See Fultz v. Neighborhood Legal Servs., 654 F. Supp. 881, 885-86 (W.D. Pa. 1987)
(holding that an individual denied legal services had no private action under the LSCA
enforceable under the civil rights statute); Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid,
Inc., 615 F. Supp. 916, 937 (N.D. Tex. 1985), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
848 F.2d 544 (holding that there was no private cause of action under the LSCA for
individuals aggrieved by violations of the act); see also generally Nabke v. HUD, 520 F.
Supp. 5 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (holding no private right of action for alleged discrimination
under the misuse of LSC funds and noting that both houses deleted the section of the act
proposing a right of action because it would undercut the purpose of the act).
135. See Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 940 F.2d 685,688 (D.C. Cir.
1991); see also S. REP. No. 104-392, at 2-3 (1996).
136. See Texas Rural Legal Aid, 940 F.2d at 688.
137. See id. at 692 (noting that the LSC is empowered to implement the LSCA through
the traditional administrative rule-making process).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(1-10). For example, LSC funding may not be used to
provide legal assistance in any proceeding or litigation seeking to procure a
nontherapeutic abortion. See id. § 2996f(b)(8). LSC funding may not be used in any
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restrictions extend to a grantee's non-LSC funding as well.3 9
Ideological attacks on the LSCA have continued since its enactment.1
40
Arguably, most of these attacks stemmed from conservatives in the
Republican controlled Congress in the later 1980's and 1990's. 41 When
the Republicans held the majority in Congress after 1994, there was
another attempt to dismantle the legal service program through reduced
funding, but President Clinton vetoed the Republican budget plan.'4 1 In
1996, Congress finally passed legislation affecting the LSCA.43 In return
for retaining the Legal Service Corporation, the legal service
organization grantees were given less funding and more restrictions 4' 4
Conservatives argue that the 1996 restrictions are essential to
achieving the LSCA's purpose.4 1 Under the conservatives' observations,
past legal aid attorneys misused federal funds to pursue their own
"radical agenda.' ' 46 Such a pursuit tends to divert taxpayer money from
the real purpose'47 of the democratically enacted statute and may even
make the poor worse off. 48  Liberals argue that the 1996 restrictions
"undermine the legal representation grantees provide low-income
clients.' '4 9 In essence, liberals argue that the restrictions interfere with
indigents' efforts to seek redress under the legal system."0 Although the
proceeding or litigation relating to desegregation. See id. § 2996f(b)(9).
139. See id. § 2996i(c) ("[N]on-federal funds.., shall not be expended by recipients for
any purpose prohibited by this subchapter.").
140. Yoder, for example, argues that in the 1980's President Regan substantially
reduced funding and instituted a number of changes to ensure compliance of "'left-wing
radicals[']" thought to control legal service organizations across the country. Yoder, supra
note 11, at 834 (citing Joseph A. Dailing, Their Finest Hour: Lawyers, Legal Aid and
Public Service in Illinois, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 7 (1995)). One such change was a
regulation requiring the majority of grantee board of directors to be appointed by the
largest bar association in the grantee's service area. See Dailing, supra, at 21.
141. See Yoder, supra note 11, at 834 & n.12. It is argued that conservatives seek to
limit the LSCA because, in their view, "legal aid attorneys misus[e] the LSC funding by
pursuing their own political agendas rather than using the funds to provide basic legal
services poor people need." Id. at 830.
142. See Yoder, supra note 11, at 834.
143. See id.
144. See id; see also Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
145. See Yoder, supra note 11, at 842.
146. Id. (citing to testimony from Rep. Dan Burton, stating that the activities pursued
by legal service grantees serve no real benefit to the poor).
147. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (explaining that the LSCA's real
purpose was to provide legal assistance in limited circumstances to those unable to afford
it).
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1996 restrictions suggest a conservative victory in the ideological debate,
there is no indication that this debate will end in the near future,
especially as the legality of the restrictions is decided. 5'
The 1996 Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act
(OCCRA' 52 created nineteen new restrictions in the LSCA.'53 This
Comment focuses primarily on OCRAA § 504(a)(16), which prohibits
participation in efforts to reform a federal or state welfare system,
"except ... [a grantee may represent] an eligible client who is seeking
specific relief from a welfare agency if such relief does not involve an
effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing law in effect on the date
of the initiation of the representation."'54  The LSC enacted new
implementing regulations to ensure that these new restrictions comply
with and also govern the use of non-LSC funds that a grantee might
receive.15 The new implementing regulations applied to public and
private non-LSC funds156 that are used to fund any organization
"interrelated," as the pre-1996 control test determined.57  These
151. See generally id. (arguing that the real question is whether these restrictions are
constitutional; Yoder poses an argument that some of the restrictions are not); infra Part
II (analyzing recent circuit court decisions deciding the constitutionality of the restrictions
under the First Amendment).
152. OCRAA, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504(a), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
153. See id. Some of the restrictions include prohibitions on: advocating or opposing
the alteration of an elective district; influencing the issuance, amendment, or revocation of
an executive order or regulation; influencing any part of an adjudicatory proceeding of an
agency if the proceeding is to formulate or modify a policy; influencing passage or defeat
of legislation; providing legal assistance to any alien unless the alien is present in the
United States and meets other exceptions; and, participating in abortion litigation. See id.
§ 504(a)(1)-(4), (11), (14). Yoder divides the 1996 restrictions into four general categories:
(1) prohibitions on influencing government, (2) restrictions on grantees representation, (3)
restrictions on the types of cases a grantee may take, and (4) restrictions on how grantee
attorneys represent their clients. See Yoder, supra note 11, at 834.
154. OCRAA § 504(a)(16).
155. See id. § 504(d). Before 1996, the LSC implementing regulations required funds
held by the organization grantees under their "control" to be "subject to the same
restrictions as if the funds were held by the recipient ...." 50 Fed. Reg. 49,276, 49,280
(1985). LSC defined "control" as determining the "direction of management and policies"
or "influence[ing] the management or policies" of an organization so that "an arm's length
transaction may not be achieved." Id. at 49,279; see also Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal
Servs. Corp., 145 F.3d 1018, 1022 (1998) (discussing the old implementing regulations as
applied to non-federal funding).
156. See Yoder, supra note 11, at 838. Yoder suggests that prior to 1996, the
restrictions were implemented to apply to a grantee's use of private funding. See id.; see
also 45 C.F.R. § 1610.2(e) (1996) (explaining that private funds means those derived from
a source other than the government). However, after 1996 the implementing regulations
applied the new restrictions to all non-LSC funding activities. See OCRAA § 504(d).
157. 50 Fed. Reg. 49,279 (discussing all the factors considered in determining
interrelatedness).
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implementing regulations, as barring non-LSC funds to be used for the
restricted activity, were quickly challenged in federal district court as
118placing unconstitutional restrictions on the receipt of federal money.
2. LASH: The Ninth Circuit's Attempt
On January 9, 1997, a group of legal service organizations, a
representative for legal service clients, organizations funding the legal
services, and lawyers of indigent clients sought to enjoin the LSC from
enforcing restrictions placed on their activities in the United States
District Court for the District of Hawaii (LASH 1).159 In LASH I, the
district court enjoined the LSC from enforcing many of the restrictions
because it found that it was substantially likely that the restrictions
placed an unconstitutional condition on First Amendment rights by
conditioning the benefit on the relinquishment of those rights.' 60 The
district court based its ruling on the fact that the regulations of
"interrelated" organizations, as defined under the statute, did not allow
the grantee to form an affiliate organization to pursue the prohibited
activity with non-LSC funds.161 Ultimately, the LASH I court held that
without adequate channels to create affiliates, the regulations unduly
burdened the grantee's protected rights to lobby, to associate, and to
158. See Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1402, 1414-15 (D.
Haw. 1997) (LASH I) (addressing whether both the restrictions and the implementing
regulations were constitutional).
159. See id. at 1406-07. It is important to note that the unconstitutional conditions
analysis addresses the organizations' and lawyers' rights to free speech and not the clients'.
Thus, in determining whether alternative channels exist, this analysis considers whether
such channels exist for the corporation (non-profit) and lawyers. See id. at 1414.
160. See id. at 1417. The district court analysis focused on whether the restrictions
foreclosed completely the use of non-federal funds for the restricted, yet constitutionally
protected rights. See id. at 1405. The district court first determined that the restrictions do
implicate certain constitutional rights and then turned to the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine to decide whether the rights are restricted to such an extent that congress should
be enjoined. See id. at 1411. To determine the extent of the restrictions, the district court
analyzed the application of the restrictions under the implementing regulations. See id. at
1415. These implementing regulations applied the restrictions to any organization
"interrelated," with the federal (LSC) funds. Id. (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 49,279). The
"interrelatedness" of funds was determined by whether the organization determined the
"direction of management and policies [or] influence the management or policies [of
another organization] to the extent that an arm's length transaction may not be achieved."
50 Fed. Reg. at 49,279 (defining the "control" test).
161. LASH 1, 961 F. Supp. at 1416-17. The LASH I court relied on Rust, TWR, and
LWV for the proposition that the government may select what to subsidize if there is not a
complete bar on the grantees using non-LSC funds to pursue their own viewpoints. See id.
at 1414. In reaching its conclusions, the district court found the LSC regulations more
analogous to the ones struck down in LWV than those in Rust and TWR. See id. at 1416.
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access the courts. 162
The LSC responded to this ruling and enacted integrity regulations
modeled after the Rust decision. 163 These regulations required recipients
to maintain financially and physically separate organizations from the
unrestricted organizations. Ultimately, the United States District
Court for the District of Hawaii addressed a constitutional conditionsS 161
challenge and upheld the regulations.
Dissatisfied with this decision, the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth
Circuit.' 66 Appellants argued that the restrictions, as implemented under
the regulations, set an unconstitutional condition on receiving federal
funds by forcing them to relinquish their First Amendment rights to free
speech; therefore, no set of circumstances existed in which the LSCA
would be valid. As in Rust, the appellants invoked the unconstitutional
condition doctrine and argued that the restrictions prohibited the
recipients from using non-LSC funds to engage in activities protected by
the First Amendment. 16  In essence, the appellants contended that this
162. See id. 1415-16.
163. See 62 Fed. Reg. 12,101, 12,101-04 (1997). These regulations were "interim"
regulations, intended to address the past constitutional challenges. Id. The "interim"
regulations were different than the previous regulations in two primary respects: (1)
nonfederal funds transferred to controlled affiliates would cease to be subject to the
restrictions; and (2) grantees could maintain a relationship with "affiliates" so long as they
met the program's integrity standards. Id. Different from Rust and proving fatal to these
"interim" regulations was the fact that they stated that organizations under grantee
control: (1) are subject to restrictions; (2) required the existence of separate facilities
instead of just consideration of degree of separation; and (3) based the separation on all
the facts and circumstances. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323, 332-34
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that a final decision on the "interim" regulations should be
withheld). The final LSC regulations eliminated these differences and were handed down
on May 21, 1997. See id. at 334 (noting that the revised final rules are virtually identical to
those upheld in Rust and holding that they were constitutional).
164. See Use of Non-LSC Funds, Transfer of LSC Funds, Program Integrity, 45 C.F.R.
§ 1610.8 (1999) (noting that the grantee must comply with a list of factors such as
maintaining a separate personnel and facilities for "affiliate" organizations using non-LSC
funding for restricted activities and this affiliate must be a separate legal entity).
165. See Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 981 F. Supp. 1288, 1294 (D.
Haw. 1997) (LASH II) (upholding the regulations under Rust), affd in relevant part, Legal
Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 145 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 1998) (LASH III); see also
Velazquez, 985 F. Supp. at 338-39 (upholding the regulations under Rust).
166. See LASH 111, 145 F.3d at 1020. U.S. Supreme Court Justice White sat by
designation on the majority in Rust.
167. See id. at 1024. This was a facial challenge, so the appellants faced the heavy
burden of proving that no set of circumstances existed under which the Act is valid. See
id. at 1023.
168. See id. at 1024. The First Amendment rights included the freedom to associate
and lobby legislators, along with the freedom of expression. See id. (citing California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-513, 515 (1972) for the
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case fit into the initial and purest form of the unconstitutional conditions
S 169
precedent.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling and
held that the LSC restrictions did not violate appellants' First
Amendment rights.7" The court concluded that "neither the
congressional enactments nor the implementing regulations infringe on
First Amendment rights."'' In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth
Circuit insisted that Rust controlled.'72 As in Rust, the court stated that
the government was not denying a benefit to anyone, but "simply
insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were
authorized.' 73  Thus, because the language of the implementing
regulations did not force the recipient to give up prohibited activity and
called for a separate and distinct affiliate, the implementing regulations
could not be struck down. 74
3. Velazquez: The Second Circuit's Attempt
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed
a similar constitutional challenge to the same congressional restrictions
and LSC implementing regulations in Velazquez v. Legal Services
Corporation.' The plaintiffs, consisting of lawyers of legal service
organizations, their indigent clients, and contributors to the
organizations, brought suit to enjoin the LSC from enforcing the
.proposition that there is a right to organize and lobby).
169. See id. The appellants argued that the statement in Sindermann controls, "that
even though the government may deny [a] benefit... [it may not deny a benefit.., on a
basis that infringes [a person's] constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest
in freedom of speech." Id. (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). With
Sindermann as the pioneering case for the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, many
commentators argue that this statement is too simplistic, as it fails to "specify the nature of
the First Amendment rights to be protected, and, in particular, it fails to specify whether
the parameters of those rights are contingent upon the granting of the benefit." Robert C.
Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 156 (1996).
170. See LASH I11, 145 F.3d at 1031. The court remanded the case on the issue of
whether the restrictions violated the due process and equal protection rights of the
appellants' clients and ordered the district court to dismiss the complaint because the
appellants did not have standing to bring such a claim. See id.
171. Id. at 1024. It is important to note that the court continued to supply reasoning
only for the holding that the implementing regulations are not unconstitutional. See id. at
1024-29.
172. See id. at 1023-24 (noting that the Rust appellants brought an identical facial
challenge to the abortion counseling restrictions and recognizing that a heavy burden
exists).
173. Id. at 1025; cf Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991).
174. See LASH II1, 145 F.3d at 1025.
175. 164 F.3d 757 (2nd Cir. 1999), affd, 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001).
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restrictions.'76  The plaintiffs argued that both the congressional
restrictions and LSCA regulations violated various provisions of the
Constitution.'77
The Second Circuit78 upheld the restrictions and LSCA regulations
under a facial unconstitutional conditions challenge.179 For the most part,
the Second Circuit upheld the LSCA's restrictions against a viewpoint
discrimination challenge.... Yet, the court struck down a narrow
restriction within the "suits-for-benefits" exception, as
• • 182
unconstitutionally discriminating based on viewpoint. Pursuant to this
176. See id. at 759. The plaintiffs filed suit in January, 1997. See id. at 761.
177. See id. at 759, 761. The plaintiffs contended that the implementing regulations
unduly burdened their use of non-federal money, therefore violating the First, Fifth, and
Tenth Amendments to the Constitution. See id. at 761. The plaintiffs also contended that
the LSCA restrictions violated the First Amendment, Tenth Amendment, and the
separation of powers doctrine. See id. This Comment focuses primarily on the argument
that the restrictions violated the First Amendment's free speech clause.
178. At the trial level, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied
the preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs failed to establish a probability of success
on the merits. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323, 326-27 (E.D.N.Y.
1997). The district court, waiting until the LSC issued its "final" rules, found the
regulations virtually identical to those upheld in Rust and determined that the Rust
opinion was dispositive. Id. at 335.
179. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 767. The court recognized that there may be
circumstances where the implementing regulations will "prove unduly burdensome and
inadequately justified .... Id. However, because this was a facial challenge, such was
not the circumstance. See id. In order to demonstrate that restrictions are in fact unduly
burdensome, an "as-applied challenge" must be brought. Id. In concluding that the
restrictions survived the unconstitutional conditions challenge, the Second Circuit, under
the auspices of Regan, LWV, and Rust, inferred the proposition that Congress is entitled
to burden the plaintiff's First Amendment rights so long as there exists "adequate
alternative channels for protected expression." Id. at 766. But see infra Part III.B.1
(arguing that the Second Circuit arrived at the appropriate test after misreading
precedent). Because the LSC grantees received substantial non-federal funding, the court
found that separately incorporated affiliates could be established without serious difficulty
and, thus, reasoned that adequate channels of expression existed. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d
at 767.
180. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 767-69. The lobbying and welfare reform provisions
were the only LSCA restrictions before the court. See id. at 767 & n.6 (noting that the
plaintiffs' brief suggested that the redistricting and abortion provisions were viewpoint
discriminating; however, because the plaintiffs failed to address this in the lower court,
these restrictions were not on appeal).
181. See OCRAA, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504(a)(16), 110 Stat. 1321, (1996) (expressing
that the prohibitions do not prohibit a grantee lawyer from representing "an individual
eligible client who is seeking specific relief from a welfare agency if such relief does not
involve an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing law in effect on the date of the
initiation of the representation"). The Second Circuit referred to this as the "suits-for-
benefits" exception. Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 769.
182. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 770, 772. It is important to note that the majority
stated that the LASH III court reached a similar result with the district court in this case
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holding, the Second Circuit ordered the district court to sever this
provision, which prevented a lawyer from arguing "to amend or
otherwise challenge existing law."' 83
The Second Circuit, in finding this narrow restriction impermissible,
proposed that the "suits-for-benefits" exception discourages challenges
to existing welfare laws by funding only lawyers who promise not to
make such a challenge.'84 Due to this viewpoint discrimination, the
Second Circuit strictly scrutinized the restriction, and concluded that it
was unconstitutional.8  Judge Jacobs dissented, arguing that the
exception serves the same purpose as the other LSCA restrictions and
should not be struck down as viewpoint discrimination.86 The dissent
ultimately suggested that the majority split with the Ninth Circuit in
LASH III due to its viewpoint discrimination ruling and that the
Supreme Court would need to address this issue.8 7
because it dismissed the unconstitutional conditions challenge by holding that Rust
controls. See id. at 762 & n.4. To evade the circuit split with the Second Circuit and
LASH III, the majority also stated that LASH III addressed only the claims based on
unconstitutional conditions and not claims based on abridgment of the lawyer-client
relationship and viewpoint discrimination. See id.
183. Id. at 773 (quoting OCRAA § 504(a)(16)). This Comment argues that because
the Second Circuit struck down the provision within the "suits-for-benefits" exception, the
exception engulfs the welfare reform provision and opens the flood gates for litigation
challenging existing welfare laws. See infra Part III.A (suggesting that the Supreme Court
should reverse the Second Circuit on this point).
184. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 769-70. But see infra Part 1I.B.2 (arguing that the
Second Circuit's reasoning is flawed); see also infra Part 11I.B.2 (suggesting that the "suits-
for-benefits" exception is consistent with Congress's LSCA restrictions in promoting the
purpose of the LSCA). The Second Circuit's viewpoint discrimination ruling produced a
vigorous dissent by Judge Jacobs who argued that "the majority only vaguely articulates
the viewpoint that is supposedly disfavored ...and (reciprocally) never states what
viewpoint is favored." Id. at 777 (Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting).
185. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 772. The court cited Rosenberger, Rust, and Finley as
relevant Supreme Court decisions to address the complex question of whether the
discrimination is illegal in a subsidized speech context. See id. at 770.
186. See id. at 774 (Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting); see also infra Part lII.B.2
(arguing the same while applying a different reading of precedent).
187. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 777 ("There is one sure fire way to find out whether
the Supreme Court meant what it said in Rust and Finley, and now that the majority has
split with the Ninth Circuit on this issue, we may not have long to wait.").
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II. ANALYZING LASH III AND VELAZQUEZ: TWO COURTS FAIL To
APPLY THE MODEL AND DEMONSTRATE THE CONFUSION CAUSED BY
THE VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION DOCTRINE'S CONTINUED USE IN
SUBSIDIZED SPEECH CASES
A. Lash III: Proper Conclusions, Improper Explanations
The Ninth Circuit, in Lash III, belittled the complexity of the First
Amendment challenge to the LSCA restrictions by resting its holding
solely on the "nearly identical" similarities between the implementing
regulations in Rust and LASH 111.188 Yet, the court correctly explained
that the constitutionality of the LSCA restrictions depends solely on
whether the implementing regulations prohibit the plaintiff grantees
from engaging in protected conduct. 9 The court found that the LSC
implementing regulations passed this test because the recipients were
188. Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 145 F.3d 1017, 1024 (1998) (LASH
III). Justice White never mentioned the argument that the LSCA restrictions alone
violate the First Amendment, but looks to the Act as applied through the implementing
regulations. See generally id. at 1020-29. Justice White did affirm, however, the district
court's judgment that "the LSC restrictions do not violate appellants' First Amendment
rights." Id. at 1031 (emphasis added). Justice White also recognized the plaintiffs' claim
that the restrictions and the implementing regulations are facially unconstitutional. See id.
at 1022. Taking this into account, Judge Jacobs's dissent in Velazquez suggested that the
Second Circuit split with LASH III. Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 776 (Jacobs, J., concurring and
dissenting) (stating that the Ninth Circuit, in LASH III, "rejected a viewpoint
discrimination challenge to the LSC restrictions that are at issue on this appeal"). Judge
Leval, writing for the Velazquez majority, contended, in an attempt to avoid the circuit
split, that the LASH III court did not address the viewpoint discrimination claim, but only
the unconstitutional conditions challenge. Id. at 762 & n.4.
This illustrates the confusion in applying both the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine and viewpoint discrimination doctrine to test the constitutionality of restrictions
on subsidizing speech, which this Comment proposes may be eliminated with correct
reading of the precedent. See infra Part III.B. Because the LASH III and Velazquez
courts are clearly at odds on the constitutionality of the LSCA restrictions (at least with
respect to the "suits-for-benefits" exception) and, especially with their readings of the
Supreme Court's subsidized speech precedent, Supreme Court clarification is desperately
needed. See infra Part III.
189. See LASH III, 145 F.3d at 1026. Justice White stated this test in response to the
plaintiffs' argument that because the restrictions are on the recipients directly, this case fits
squarely into a paradigmatic unconstitutional conditions context. See id. at 1025-26. The
plaintiffs' argument rested on language in Rust where the court distinguished between
restrictions on recipients and restrictions on projects. See id. (noting that the argument
misreads the Rust Court describing an unconstitutional conditions situation: "'The
Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a
particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in
the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program."') (citing Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991)).
2001]
Catholic University Law Review
able to participate in prohibited activity through a separate entity.19 The
regulations did not entirely prohibit conduct outside the scope of the
federally funded program;1 9' rather, Congress simply chose to fund one
activity over another.' 92
The appellants provided a very strong argument to pull away from
Rust by analogizing this case to Rosenberger.93 They argued that the
LSC is a program designed to encourage private speech, i.e., to establish
a public forum.' 94  Under Rosenberger, such a program deserves
heightened scrutiny and any restrictions favoring one type of speech over
another would be unconstitutional.' 95 The court only paid lip service to
this argument and, without supplying a reason, concluded that the LSC
program promotes a particular policy of providing professional services
within a limited scope and does not create a forum for the free
expression of ideas.'9
The appellants' argument implicates a fundamental threshold question
in unconstitutional conditions cases that the court trivialized.
97
190. See id. at 1026-27.
191. See id. at 1026 (citing Regan and LWV for this proposition). The court articulates
this proposition from the fact that in Regan, the regulations were upheld because it was
possible to create a separate entity, whereas in LWV the regulations were struck down
because it was impossible to create a separate entity with nonfederal funding. See id.
192. See id. at 1026-27. Thus, the court does not fall for the appellant's attempt to
divert its focus away from the Rust precedent. See id. at 1027. The appellants also
contended that the regulations would produce a hardship on the recipients, which was not
realized in Rust. See id. Yet, the court notes correctly that such an argument is
inapplicable to a facial challenge and should be reserved for an "as applied" challenge. Id.
193. See id. at 1028; see also Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. 569,
598-99 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting the same); Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 774-76
(Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting) ("Rosenberger curbs the government's power to
fund some viewpoints to the exclusion of others, that limitation operates only when the
government creates a limited public forum for the expression of diverse viewpoints.");
Lewis, supra note 14, at 1193-97 (arguing that Rosenberger utilized the public forum
doctrine to invalidate subsidized speech restrictions that were viewpoint discrimination);
infra Part III.B (suggesting that Rosenberger provides an exception to the legality of
setting viewpoint discriminating restrictions on congressional funding).
194. See LASH 111, 145 F.3d at 1028 (arguing that Rust, in contrast, involved a
government program using private speakers to transmit its own view).
195. Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
196. See LASH 111, 145 F.3d at 1028; see also infra Part III.B.2.a (arguing that the
LSCA does not create a public forum).
197. See infra Part III (arguing that precedent reveals that the threshold question is
whether the purpose of funding is to allow private speakers to express views in a public
forum); see also Post, supra note 169, at 152. Post argues that in subsidized speech cases
the speaker's status is uncertain, which forces the court to determine whether the speaker
is an "independent participant[] in the formation of public opinion or instead as
instrumentalities of the government." Id. It renders uncertain the status of government
action, which implicates the question of whether the subsidies are government regulations
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Moreover, the court's simplistic reliance on Rust offered only a
conclusion that the LSC regulations properly implement the restrictions
on legal service grantees without insightful reasoning.'" This prolonged
the uncertainty and left courts, at least within the Ninth Circuit, without
a solid analytical framework by which to analyze similar funding cases.
B. Velazquez: Some Proper Conclusions, Improper Explanations, and a
Misapplication of the Viewpoint Discrimination Doctrine
1. Unconstitutional Conditions: Arriving at the Proper Conclusion
Despite Improperly Reading Precedent
Similar to LASH III, the Second Circuit in Velazquez held that the
LSCA, as the implementing regulations would apply it, did not
unreasonably burden the grantee's ability to use nonfederal funds for
restricted activities.' 99 Yet, to reach this conclusion, the Second Circuit
split with the Ninth Circuit in its reasoning.200 While the Ninth Circuit
relied solely on Rust to dismiss the unconstitutional conditions argument,
or a form of government participation. See id.
198. See LASH I1, 145 F.3d at 1023-27.
199. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 767 (2d Cir. 1999), affd, 121 S.
Ct. 1043 (2001). Plaintiffs first argued that the restrictions interfered with the
associational bond between a lawyer and client and therefore violated the First
Amendment. See id. at 764. To support their argument, plaintiffs relied on a statement
from Rust: "traditional relationships such as between doctor and patient should enjoy
protection under the First Amendment from Government regulation, even when
subsidized by the Government." Id. (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991));
see also Rust, 500 U.S. at 200 (holding that there was no First Amendment violation based
on this principle because the doctor-patient relationship is not "all-encompassing" and
finding and the patients were on notice of the programs limits). The court dismissed this
argument by noting that the Rust statement was dictum and left open for adjudication the
question of whether such a relationship confers constitutional protection. See Velazquez,
164 F.3d at 764. The question remained open in Velazquez because, similarly to Rust, the
lawyer-client relationship under the LSCA is not "all-encompassing." Id. at 764-65. The
majority recognized that the limitations on the legal services offered should be disclosed to
the client before that relies to his detriment on a full range of services. See id. at 765.
The majority first dismissed the statutory interpretation claim that LSC
regulations constitute an unreasonable interpretation of Congress's 1996 Act. See id. at
763-64 (dismissing the claim under Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)); see also Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp.,
940 F.2d 685, 690 (1991) (holding that LSC enjoys full interpretive authority under the
LSCA). After recognizing that the LSC's interpretations deserve deference, the majority
turned to the constitutional claims. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 764.
200. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 765-66 (drawing from a guiding principle for
unconstitutional conditions challenges from Regan, LWV, and Rust); supra Part II.A and
accompanying notes (suggesting that the LASH III court handed down its decision by
observing the factual similarities with Rust).
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the Second Circuit relied on a "guiding framework" of precedent.20'
The Second Circuit first erred in citing Regan's dictum as holding for
the misleading proposition that subsidized speech restrictions are
unconstitutional if aimed at the speaker's view.2 2 To the contrary, Regan
upheld restrictions on lobbying by tax-exempt organizations, reasoning
that the government is not obligated to subsidize First Amendment
activities.0 3 The Regan Court noted that only "if" Congress intended to
suppress a speaker's view then the case would be different.211 Subsequent
case law demonstrated that this dictum attributed to nothing more than
the narrow exception that when government funds a public forum, the
restrictions must define the forum and not aim at the suppression of
viewpoints within the forum's boundaries.
The Second Circuit's second error occurred in suggesting that Rust is
the "least pertinent of precedents."20 Despite having identical
implementing regulations at issue, the court argued that this case differed
from Rust in that the LSCA's speech restrictions were very broad and did
not attempt to promote a specific governmental message. According to
the Velazquez court, the Rust restrictions were "limited to speech at odds
with the values Congress was seeking to advance through its grant
201. Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 765. In fact, the Second Circuit differs substantially from
the LASH III court in observing that Rust is "superficially similar" to the case at hand and
actually the least pertinent of the precedents. Id. at 766. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit
concluded, as the Ninth Circuit did, that the First Amendment allows for the restrictions
because there are, under a facial challenge, adequate alternative channels for expressing
the prohibited activities. See id. at 767.
202. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 765 ("Because [Regan] was not an instance where
'Congress [had] discriminate[d] invidiously . . . to aim at the suppression of dangerous
ideas' the Court applied minimal scrutiny and upheld the law.") (citing Regan v. Taxation
with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983)). The court then suggested that the Regan
Court "noted" that TWR was able to establish alternative means to speak without giving
up its benefit. See id. But see supra Part I.C.1 (discussing Regan as finding this to be
conclusive fact).
203. Regan, 461 U.S. at 546 (using a rights-privilege analysis and stating that
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), which held that "Congress is not
required by the First Amendment to subsidize lobbying," controlled the issue); see also
supra Part I.C.1 and accompanying notes (discussing Regan).
204. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 548 ("We have already explained why we conclude that
Congress has not violated TWR's First Amendment rights by declining to subsidize its
First Amendment activities. The case would be different if .... ").
205. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995);
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (refusing to extend this dictum to funding
restrictions).
206. Compare Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 766, with Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs.
Corp., 145 F.3d 1017, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998) (LASH III) (holding that Rust controls).
207. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 766 (interpreting Rust to find that the government
intended to speak out against abortion as a method of family planning).
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program., 20 8 The Velazquez court explicitly noted that this is not a case
where restrictions are used to avoid interference with a governmental
message, because no governmental message is advanced under the
LSCA.' 9 In distinguishing Rust on this narrow ground, the court assured
that Rust did not control and provided itself with an opening to analyze
whether the restrictions discriminated on viewpoint.210
This narrow reading of Rust is misplaced. The Velazquez court should
have looked to Rust itself and not to subsequent case discussions of Rust
for its precedential value."' The Rust opinion stands for the proposition
that speech restrictions are valid when they are used to ensure that the
purpose for which the government spends money is fulfilled.2 2  The
"purpose" of the restrictions in Rust was to establish a family planning
organization, not an abortion-counseling clinic."3
Despite this misreading of precedent, the Second Circuit applied the
appropriate principles in judging an unconstitutional conditions
challenge.1  Conglomerating these principles, the court suggested that
"Congress may burden the First Amendment rights of recipients of
208. Id. (emphasis added) (citing to Rosenberger's discussion of Rust: "'When the
government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message,
it may ... ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee"); see
also, e.g., Post, supra note 169, at 185 (arguing that it is fundamental to characterize the
grantee as an instrumentality of the government or private participant in public discourse
when analyzing subsidized speech cases).
209. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 766 (stating that Congress is simply choosing to hold
organizations that accept LSC funds to finance certain activities over others).
210. See infra Part II.B.2.
211. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing how Judge Leval looks to
Rosenberger for the principle in the Rust case). In fact, Judge Leval deviates from the
lesson he provides later in his opinion that "'[i]t is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that
general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which
those expressions are used."' Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 770 (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821)).
212. See supra Part I.C.3 and accompanying notes (discussing Rust). That the Rust
Court sought to protect restrictions that helped fulfill the program's purpose is especially
evident when Justice Rehnquist noted that holding otherwise would invalidate numerous
government programs. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991). Even Rosenberger
acknowledged that a certain speech restriction is valid so long as it confines the program
to the "limited and legitimate purpose for which it was created." Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). Allowing speech restrictions to
ensure the government's purpose in conferring a benefit is fulfilled is consistent with
allowing speech restrictions to ensure that the purpose of a government job is fulfilled.
See supra note 47 (discussing Pickering and its progeny along with the public forum
doctrine).
213. If Rust stands for the proposition that whenever the government "speaks,"
inquiry is required into what the government is trying to say beyond the language of the
statute, then this could prove to be an impossible task.
214. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 765-66.
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government benefits if the recipients are left with adequate alternative
channels for protected expression."2 '5 Under this, the majority upheld
the final implementing regulations because adequate alternative
channels existed . 6
2. Viewpoint Discrimination: The Misapplication of Precedent Leads to
an Improper Conclusion
a. The Application of Viewpoint Discrimination Doctrine Is a
Function of the Type of Speech at Issue
In distinguishing Rust and categorizing the LSCA as not advancing a
governmental message, the Velazquez court set the stage to analyze the
restrictions under the viewpoint discrimination doctrine.2 " By inference,
if the LSCA does not promote a governmental message then, like
Rosenberger, it must promote private messages in a public forum and not
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. 8 Yet, the court does not cite to
Rosenberger for this argument; in fact, the court explicitly rejects it.2"9
215. Id. at 766. From Regan, the court drew the principle that if the restrictions allow
for a financially independent, wholly controlled affiliate, they are constitutional. See id. at
765. The Second Circuit added support to this proposition by citing to LWV, which held
that a condition is unconstitutional when it acts as a total bar to the use of non-federal
funds in a protected First Amendment activity. See id. at 765-66 (noting that the LWV
Court emphasized that the statute could be amended to establish affiliate organizations
and the restrictions on editorializing would be upheld). Finally, the Velazquez court cited
Rust to complete the framework upon which to rule on the unconstitutional conditions
argument. See id. at 766. The court stated that in Rust, the unconstitutional conditions
claim failed because the grantees were not "effectively prohibited" from using nonfederal
funds for the restricted activities. Id.
216. See id. at 766-67. Similar to the LASH III appellants, the Velazquez plaintiffs
argued that, notwithstanding precedent, the program integrity regulations imposed
"extraordinary burdens" on the exercise of their First Amendment rights and acted as an
absolute bar for affiliates. Id. at 767. Like the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit dismissed
this argument because it was a facial challenge. See id. Nevertheless, the Velazquez court
carefully suggested that in some cases the regulations will prove unduly burdensome and
thus unjustified. See id. The court emphasized that a grantee capable of proving such is
free to bring an "as-applied challenge" to the 1996 Act. Id.
217. See id. at 767 (discussing the viewpoint discrimination challenge).
218. See id at 768; supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's
distinctions of Rust and dismissing the possibility that the grantee is a government
instrumentality). In so doing, the majority, by logical inference, could state that the
grantee may be classified as a private entity and, thus, entitled to full First Amendment
protection. See generally Post, supra note 169; Lewis, supra note 14 (arguing that some
LSCA restrictions are unconstitutional when analogized to Rosenberger and applied to the
public forum exception). But see infra Part III.B.2 (arguing that the LSC program is not a
public forum, therefore, Rosenberger does not apply).
219. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 770-71. The court rejects the use of this argument by
refuting the dissent's reading of the precedent. See id. The dissent reads the precedent to
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In addressing whether subsidized speech restrictions found to be
viewpoint discrimination are unconstitutional, the Velazquez court
suggested that a court should take from precedent not what was said, but
what was done.2' Thus, in considering Rust, the court rejected the notion
that viewpoint discrimination is generally permissible for subsidized
speech restrictions because Rust proved to be only a "semantic
endorsement" for funding one activity over another.2' Rather, the court
squared the Rust and Finley holdings with Rosenberger by suggesting that
subsidized speech cases turn on the type of speech being "restricted," not
on the purpose of the funding.222 When the speech at issue is one
traditionally deserving the highest First Amendment protection,
viewpoint discriminatory restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. 3
allow viewpoint discrimination in funding restrictions unless, like Rosenberger, the
government "'encourage[s] a diversity of views from private speakers."' Id. at 776
(Jacobs, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)).
220. See id. at 770 (refuting the dissent's position, which the court believed to rest on
language in Rust). The court stated that:
The Government can't... selectively fund a program ... it believes to be in the
public interest, without ... funding an alternative program which seeks to deal
with the problem in another way ... it has merely chosen to fund one activity to
the exclusion of the other."
Id. (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)). The majority provided a lesson in
precedential value when it stated that explanations seemingly sound "in the context of the
facts for which they are devised often carry implications the court would never subscribe
to if applied to other facts not in contemplation." Id. (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821), for the proposition that general expressions should be taken in
connection with the case; beyond the case, they should be respected but not controlling).
221. Id. at 771. To lend support that the Rust language is not applicable outside of its
context, the majority offered a hypothetical. See id. The majority stated that the Rust
court would never uphold a congressional act that provided funding to an institute to study
the nation's foreign or domestic policy on the condition that the institute not criticize or
advocate change in government. See id. The majority, however, recognized that Justice
Scalia, and possibly Justice Thomas, might endorse such an act because in Finley they took
the position that Congress may fund "ad libitum, insofar as the First Amendment is
concerned." Id. at 771 n.8 (quoting National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct.
2168, 2184 (1998)). Still, the majority noted that the Finley Court made clear that the First
Amendment still applies in the subsidy context. See id.
222. Id. at 771 ("We think the resolution lies in the fact that different types of speech
enjoy different degrees of protection under the First Amendment.").
223. See id. at 770 (citing Rosenberger for the proposition that discrimination against
speech because of message is presumed unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny).
The dissent necessarily calls for Supreme Court review after the majority's
misreading of precedent. See id. at 776 (Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting).
Essentially, the dissent understood the Supreme Court authority to state that Congress is
entitled to specify the services a program may provide and, in doing so, may fund some
rights at the exclusion of others. See id. at 775-76 (Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting).
Like the Ninth Circuit, the dissent relied heavily on Rust and quoted Rust for the
proposition that the government may select to fund activities it believes to be in the public
interest at the exclusion of others. See id. at 776 (Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting)
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b. Determining Whether the LSCA Restrictions Discriminate on
Viewpoint
Before the Velazquez court argued that viewpoint discriminating
restrictions in subsidized speech cases were suspect if the speech at issue
traditionally enjoyed the highest rung of First Amendment protection, it
addressed which LSCA restrictions discriminated on viewpoint."' The
court conceded that Congress may set subject matter restrictions to
properly "confine [the LSC program] to the limited and legitimate
purpose for which it was created," 25 as long as they were viewpoint
(quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 193). According to the dissent, the only caveat to this general
proposition in subsidized speech cases is that when the government deliberately creates a
public forum for the expressed purpose of expressing diversity in views, the government
may not fund one viewpoint at the exclusion of others. See id. (Jacobs, J., concurring and
dissenting). The dissent's classification of this case as closer to Rust than Rosenberger
supported the conclusion that the government is allowed, through the exception, to
express one view over another. See id. (Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting). This
conclusion is consistent with the view that the LSC grantees are instrumentalities of the
government expressing its message and not private participants in public discourse
expressing their own views. See generally Post, supra note 169. To support this
categorization, the dissent noted that the LSC grantee is a contractor furnishing services
for the government and that no public forum was created. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 777-
78 (Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting).
According to the dissent, the majority inappropriately relies on Rosenberger,
where the purpose was to fund the expression of diverse views. See id. at 776 (Jacobs, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Evidence of this reliance is found in the majority's
hypothetical which the dissent views as strikingly similar to the Rosenberger facts. See id.
at 777 (Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting). To refute this reliance, the dissent supplies a
more analogous hypothetical. See id. (Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting). In the
dissent's hypothetical Congress "out-sources" advice with the IRS, which is to give to the
taxpayers information on the amount they owe and can shelter; Congress underwrites
accountants and lawyers to counsel and represent the middle-class tax-payer; Congress
discovers that these contractors are using the grants for reform purposes and so specifies
that the representation be limited so that the status quo is not challenged. Id. (Jacobs, J.,
concurring and dissenting). The dissent views this as not promoting the status quo or
suppressing a point of view; it views it as a program for an identifiable public purpose,
similar to the LSC program. See id. (Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting).
224. See Velazquez, at 767-70. The court noted that the plaintiffs directed their claim
only toward the lobbying and welfare provisions of the LSCA. See id. The lobbying
provisions consist of: (1) prohibitions against attempting to influence or defeat "any
legislation, constitutional amendment, referendum, initiative, or any similar procedure of
the Congress or a State or local legislative body," OCRAA, Pub. L. No. 104-134
§504(a)(4), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); (2) prohibitions against attempting to influence "any
part of any adjudicatory proceeding ... if such part of the proceeding is designed for the
formulation or modification of any agency policy," OCRAA § 504(a)(3); and (3)
prohibitions against attempting to influence "any executive order, regulation, or other
statement," OCRAA § 504(a)(2).
225. Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 768 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
which stated that "[t]he necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate
purposes for which it was created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or
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neutral. The majority analyzed each LSCA restriction to determine if it
was viewpoint neutral and thus, defined the scope of the program, or if it
is viewpoint discriminatory and thus, a presumptive First Amendment
violation.226
In analyzing the welfare reform subsection of the LSCA,227 the
majority found a narrow provision within the subsection as not viewpoint
neutral.228 To reach its conclusion, the majority initially divided the
section as prohibiting four separate activities, and as excepting one. 9
The prohibited activities involved attempts to reform the welfare system
by: (1) representing clients; (2) participating in litigation; (3) lobbying;
and (4) rulemaking. The exception allowed a grantee to participate in
for the discussion of certain topics" (emphasis added)). It is important to note that, in
citing Rosenberger, the majority replaces the word forum with the words "the LSC
program." Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 768. The Rosenberger Court clearly meant to narrow
this test to situations where the government creates a public forum for the purpose of
promoting speech. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30 (citing to public forum cases). The
Velazquez court shies away from explicitly stating that the LSCA was created for the
purpose of creating a public forum to promote a diversity of speech, to correctly analogize
this case to Rosenberger and use such a test. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
226. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 767-70. Under this proposition, the court easily held
the lobbying provisions constitutional because they are viewpoint neutral and limit the
program with subject matter limitations. See id. at 768. The lobbying provisions prohibit
attempts "to influence the passage or defeat of any legislation, constitutional amendment,
referendum, initiative, or any similar procedure of the Congress or a State or local
legislative body." OCRAA § 504(a)(4). The court reasoned that such a prohibition
applies to any activity seeking or opposing change; therefore, it is viewpoint neutral. See
id. But note that if the purpose of the LSCA is to create a public forum, as some might
argue, prohibiting lobbying favors those who can pay attorneys to lobby and supports their
view of a new bill at the exclusion of indigent clients, thus making the lobbying provision a
viewpoint discrimination violation. Yet, if the analysis is restricted to analyzing only
whether alternative means exist, then the provision would be upheld.
227. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 768-70. OCRAA section 504(a)(16) prohibits efforts
to reform a federal or state welfare system, except a grantee may represent "an eligible
client who is seeking specific relief from a welfare agency if such relief does not involve an
effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing law in effect on the date of the initiation of
the representation." OCRAA § 504(a)(16).
228. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 769. Recall that in Rosenberger, federal funding to a
private speaker to encourage a diversity of views is a context in which viewpoint
discrimination is not permissible. See supra Part I.B.4 (discussing Rosenberger). The
dissent disagrees on this point and suggests that the majority's holding splits with the
Ninth Circuit. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 776 (Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting).
Note that the majority states that the Ninth Circuit never addressed the viewpoint
discrimination claim. See id. at 762 n.4. However, The LASH IH court held that the
LSCA restrictions and implementing regulations did not violate the Constitution; but still,
the opinion only addressed the implementing regulations and the accompanying
unconstitutional conditions claim. See supra Part II.A (analyzing LASH III).
229. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 768.
230. See id.
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representing a client if he sought a welfare benefit payment.23' The
majority analyzed each of the prohibitions and held that they are basic
limitations that are viewpoint neutral, similar to the lobbying provisions
in the LSCA. 2  By using the words "reform" and "participate,"
Congress attempted to prohibit efforts on either side of the welfare
reform debate. 3
The "suits-for-benefits" exception analysis, however, produced a
different result.3 This exception allowed for representation in litigation
when an eligible client seeks relief from welfare agencies, as long as the
litigation does not involve an effort to amend existing law at the time of
representation.2" The majority found that such an exception clearly
sought to discourage challenges to the status quo and thus, discriminated
based on viewpoint.
236
Although the critical error in the Velazquez court's viewpoint
discrimination analysis was applying the analysis itself, the Second
Circuit's finding of viewpoint discrimination in the "suits-for-benefits"
exception is also refutable27 The court reasoned that the lobbying and
the welfare provisions, less the exception, were viewpoint neutral
because the provisions restricted a grantee's speech from both
challenging and defending the status quo. The majority further
reasoned that the "suits-for-benefits" exception discriminated on the
231. See id. at 769.
232. See id. at 768-69.
233. Id. It should be noted that the court considered two possible interpretations of
the prohibition against initiating legal representation to reform the welfare system: (1) as
prohibiting only efforts to reform; or (2) as prohibiting efforts either to reform or to
oppose reform. See id. The court reasoned that both pro- and anti- reform efforts
involved or concerned welfare reform. See id. at 769. To remain consistent with both the
statute and the principle that a court shall read a statute to ensure its constitutionality, the
majority went with the latter interpretation and held the prohibition to be viewpoint
neutral. See id.
234. Id. The court held a provision within the exception as viewpoint discrimination.
See id. at 772-73.
235. See Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, § 504(a)(16) (1996). The court read this provision as
prohibiting representation challenging an existing rule that lead to a denial of benefits, i.e.
that the rule was unauthorized by regulation, statute, or the Constitution. See Velazquez,
164 F.3d at 769.
236. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 769-70. The dissent argued that the majority failed to
articulate the viewpoint that is disfavored at the expense of the one that is favored. See id.
at 777 (Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting).
237. See supra Part III (suggesting that a First Amendment challenge to the LSCA
does not require a viewpoint discrimination analysis).
238. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 768 (stating that the legislation provision "burdens no
particular viewpoint and favors neither speech in support of legislative action nor speech
opposed.").
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basis of viewpoint because it restricted a grantee from challenging, but
not defending, the status quo.239 This reasoning appears plausible, taking
into account only the language of the provision within the "suits-for-
benefits" exception, which precludes efforts to amend or challenge
240
existing law.
However, in considering the "suits-for-benefits" exception as a
whole,241 it is evident that the exception restricts speech that either
challenges or defends the status quo, as the lobbying and welfare
provisions do. The "suits-for-benefits" exception allows an eligible client
242to seek relief from a welfare agency. Implicit in this language is the
understanding that only clients who are "injured in fact" by the agency's
denial of benefits will initiate a suit.23  Standing doctrine and logic
preclude the possibility that those who received benefits will bring such a
suit.244 The defendant, as the statutory language indicates, will be the
agency that under the status quo "denied" the benefits.245 In effect, the
grantee is still restricted from defending the status quo because the
grantee's client is required to present a case or controversy.246 Thus,
applying the Second Circuit's own reasoning, the "suits-for-benefits"
exception is viewpoint neutral because neither speech for nor against the
status quo is favored at the exclusion of the other.247
239. Id. at 769-70 (reasoning that the "suits-for-benefits" exception "accords funding
to those who represent clients without making any challenge to existing rules of law, but
denies it to those whose representation challenges existing rules").
240. See OCRAA § 504(a)(16). Section 504(a)(16) provides that:
None of the funds ... may be used to provide financial assistance to any person
or entity ... that initiates legal representation or participates in any other way, in
litigation . . . involving an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare system,
except that this paragraph shall not be construed to preclude a recipient from
representing an individual eligible client who is seeking specific relief from a
welfare agency if such relief does not involve an effort to amend or otherwise
challenge existing law in effect on the date of the initiation of the representation[.]
Id. (emphasis added).
241. See id.
242. See id. (emphasis added).
243. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973) (requiring a showing of "injury
in fact" and an interest that is protected within the zone of interest of the statute to grant
standing).
244. See id.
245. See OCRAA § 504(a)(16) (limiting representation of clients to those seeking
specific relief from a "welfare agency").
246. Cf. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 686 (exemplifying that a grantee will need to show an
injury in fact, which would be a denial of welfare benefits to an eligible citizen).
247. See supra note 238 and accompanying text (discussing the Velazquez court's
reasoning for upholding the legislation provisions as viewpoint neutral). In the same light,
one could argue in line with the Velazquez dissent that the majority's reasoning would
lead to the invalidity of several LSCA restrictions. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164
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c. Concluding that the Speech at Issue Deserves the Highest Protection
from the First Amendment in Order To Strike the Viewpoint
Discriminating Restriction
To conclude that the viewpoint discriminatory "suits-for-benefits"
exception is unconstitutional, the Second Circuit proposed that
expressions of public issues deserve the utmost protection."" The court
argued that the expressions at issue were close to the core of public
issues, more so than Rust's abortion counseling or Finley's artistic
expressions. 9 To ensure that this speech is given a place on the First
Amendment's highest rung, the court added that one of the only
effective ways to change government welfare policy is for courts to hold
existing laws unconstitutional or invalid.250 The court essentially argued
that LSC funding provided clients with their only voice on welfare
matters and that the "suits-for-benefits" exception prevented this voice
from being heard.25' The court held, therefore, that there was an
absolute prohibition and, applying strict scrutiny, further held the
provision within the exception unconstitutional.252
F.3d 757, 777 (2d Cir. 1999) (Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting) (suggesting that the
majority "vaguely" articulated the disfavored viewpoint and warning that placing
limitations on "classes" of cases as impermissibly viewpoint discrimination would
invalidate many of the LSC limitations as unconstitutional), affd, 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001).
This argument relies on the premise that the "suits-for-benefits" exception may be
categorized, with the other restrictions, as defining the scope of the LSCA program. See
id. at 778 (Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting) ("[The exception] lays down specifications
for services to be provided to favored beneficiaries."); infra Part III (arguing that the
language of OCRAA section 504(a)(16) supports the interpretation that the "suits-for-
benefits" exception aids in defining the LSCA program to fulfill the purpose of the Act).
One example of the "suits-for-benefits" exception provided by the Velazquez dissent is the
subsection barring funding to litigation relating to the desegregation of any school. See
Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 777 (Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Legal Services
Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996(f)(b)(9) (1994). The dissent suggested that under the
majority's opinion this statute would discriminate against the viewpoint that schools ought
to be desegregated. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 777 (Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting);
see also supra note 223 (suggesting that the "oversight provision" of the LSCA could also
be struck down under the majority's own reasoning).
248. Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 771 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411 (1989) and
NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)).
249. See id. at 770-71.
250. See id. The dissent seriously questioned if a courtroom is a proper public forum
and whether the lawyers' voices are what the statute seeks to encourage. See id. at 777-78
(Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting). The majority refuted the dissent by arguing that
the restriction is driving views from the "prime marketplace" of ideas, i.e. the courtroom.
Id. at 771-72. (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958), for the principle that the
judiciary is supreme).
251. See id. at 771.
252. See id. at 772. The court found that it could invalidate the entire Act, the entire
welfare reform subsection, the "suits-for-benefits" exception within the subsection, or the
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C. The Supreme Court's Affirmation of the Second Circuit. A Missed
Opportunity
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's ruling earlier this
253year. In doing so, the Court failed to clarify the viewpoint
discrimination doctrine's role in subsidized speech cases and provide a
coherent analysis for lower courts to work from in subsequent subsidized
speech cases. The Court relied on the appropriate case law, but erred in
interpreting it.254  Its interpretation broadens the First Amendment's
protections, leaving many congressional programs subsidizing speech
vulnerable.
First, like the Second Circuit, the Court looked to subsequent case
discussions of Rust instead of Rust itself for its precedential value.2 1' The
Court interpreted Rust to allow a viewpoint-based restriction only
when Congress intends to send a governmental message with its
program. Rust did not hold this.257  Justice Scalia predicts the
consequence of this errant interpretation: "If the private doctors'
confidential advice to their patients at issue in Rust constituted
'government speech,' it is hard to imagine what subsidized speech would
not be government speech.
258
Second, the Court erred in citing Rosenberger for the proposition that
if the government is not speaking, but funding private speech,
viewpoint-based restrictions are not valid. 29 The Court argues that the
provision in the "suits-for-benefits" exception that one may not challenge the existing law.
See id. The court chose to strike only the smallest part of the statute and leave the rest.
See id. at 773. The court reasoned that, although striking the exception appeared
consistent with Congress's intent not to challenge the law, a grantee is allowed to argue for
changes to the law if passed after representation. See id. With the ambiguity present, the
court chose to strike only the smallest portion of the statute. See id. Finally, the court
ordered the district court to preliminarily enjoin LSC from enforcing the provision within
the "suits-for-benefits" exception. See id. In so doing, the majority opened the floodgates
for Legal Service organizations to bring suits challenging the welfare laws under the guise
of a "suits-for-benefits." See infra Part III.A. This negates the LSCA's restrictions against
lobbying Congress and enables radical groups to divert resources from fulfilling the real
purpose of the LSCA. See id.
253. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. 1043, 1046 (2001).
254. See id. at 1049 (relying primarily on Rust and Rosenberger).
255. See id. ("The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the
counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to government speech; when
interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have explained Rust on this
understanding."); see also supra Part II.B.1 (noting the Second Circuit's error in not
looking to Rust for its actual holding).
256. See Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. at 1049.
257. See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing the Rust decision).
258. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. at 1055 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
259. See id. at 1049.
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salient point is whether the program is designed to facility diversity of
speech.26 This is a fatally broad interpretation of Rosenberger. To the
contrary, Rosenberger stands for the proposition, as the Velazquez Court
quoted, that: " '[I]t does not follow ... that viewpoint-based restrictions
are proper when the [government] does not itself speak or subsidize
transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage
a diversity of views from private speakers.""'2 " A program designed to
encourage a diversity of views is not the same as a program designed to
facilitate speech. The former program seeks to establish a public forum,
whereas the latter merely provides funding for its grantees to speak. If
the latter type of program may not be limited by viewpoint restrictions,
then almost every program restriction discussed in subsidized speech
cases would have been suspect.
III. THE AFTERMATH OF LASH III AND VELAZQUEZ: PROPOSING AN
ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR ALL SUBSIDIZED SPEECH CASES
A. The Problem
The LASH III and Velazquez decisions illustrate the complexity
surrounding subsidized speech restrictions. Without clear guidance,
courts mistakenly strike essential provisions within congressional funding
restrictions under the viewpoint discrimination doctrine. This dilutes the
effect of congressional programs. For example, the Second Circuit in
Velazquez struck a provision within the "suits-for-benefits" exception of
the LSCA under the viewpoint discrimination doctrine.26 2 This opened
the floodgates for legal service grantees to bring suits challenging existing
welfare statutes.263
260. See id.
261. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819,834 (1995)).
262. Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 773. The court quickly dismissed the possibility of
invalidating the LSCA and the entire welfare reform subsection based on the principle
that "[a] court should refrain from invalidating more of [a] statute than is necessary." Id.
at 772 (citing Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 683 (1987)). The Second Circuit
argued that it should not invalidate the LSCA and the welfare reform subsection because
both were necessary for the LSC to function consistently with Congress's intent. See id.
In its reasoning, the court noted that, consistent with the principle that the statute should
continue to function as intended, subsection (a)916) would continue to bar efforts to
reform the welfare system. See id. If such is true, the court essentially said that whenever
a lawyer invokes the exception, subsection (a)(16) will still prohibit "efforts" by the lawyer
to reform the welfare system just as the provision did. Thus, when applying the court's
viewpoint discrimination rationale after it strikes the provision, is not the subjection still
viewpoint discrimination?
263. See id. at 772. The Second Circuit considered invalidating four separate parts of
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The Second Circuit recognized the drastic implications of its holding
by stating that this will allow "a grantee lawyer representing a client to
argue the invalidity of any existing rule of law."264  Still, the Second
Circuit justified its actions in reasoning that Congress's intent in drafting
the exception overrides the intention of the LSCA in general. 65 In sum,
the Second Circuit's reasoning prohibited grantees' involvement in
efforts to reform the federal or state welfare system; however, it
permitted grantees' involvement in such efforts when an individual client
seeks specific relief from a welfare agency.266 This enables any LSC
lawyer to challenge the welfare system compliments of taxpayer
dollars.267
the LSCA in accordance with its ruling: (1) the entire LSCA; (2) the entire subsection
(a)(16) relating to welfare reform; (3) the "suits-for-benefits" exception within subsection
(a)(16); and (4) the provision stating that an attorney suing for a client's benefits may not
challenge existing law. See id.
264. Id. The court recognized this despite the observation that the LSCA intended to
prohibit challenges to law. See generally LSCA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996a-1 (1994).
265. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 773 (recognizing Congress's two different/conflicting
viewpoints in its LSCA). The court reasoned that the exception expressed Congress's
intention that a lawyer engaged in representation of a client must make the arguments
necessary to secure the relief the client seeks. See id. at 772-73. The court found evidence
of Congress's intention in the statutory language, which forbids the grantee from
challenging only those laws in existence at the initiation of the suit and allows challenges to
laws passed after. See id. at 773. This reasoning is flawed for two primary reasons. First,
in a "suits-for-benefits," the lawyer will seek benefits from the welfare law that denied the
client welfare. A client will not be denied welfare benefits pursuant to laws passed after
the initiation of the suit. Thus, a lawyer will always be concerned with the statute intact
when the suit was initiated, and the provision ensures that lawyers will not challenge the
constitutionality of this law. Congress did not intend to give lawyers an opportunity to
challenge subsequently-enacted welfare laws, because in a "suits-for-benefits" case those
laws would never be at issue. Second, by its reasoning, the court essentially said that the
lawyer-client relationship should be all-encompassing in the context of welfare benefits
and thus unlimited; however, the court noted explicitly that the LSCA does not create an
all-encompassing lawyer-client relationship. See id. at 773. The restrictions that limit the
scope of the lawyers role to ensure that LSCA's intentions of not participating in lobbying,
etc., do not exist. See id. How, then, can the court argue that Congress's real intention is
to allow a lawyer to challenge welfare laws to obtain relief for his client, after arguing
previously that Congress's real intention is to avoid challenges to existing laws?
266. See id. at 773. The court's reasoning is clearly contrary to Congress's intention to
prohibit any attempts to challenge the existing law. Congress's intention is explicit in the
language of the LSCA restriction, including the language that allows a grantee to seek
benefits on behalf of a client. See id.; see also supra Part L.A (discussing that the
conservative fears in the LSC motivated the 1996 restrictions); see generally OCRAA Pub.
L. No. 104-134, § 504(a), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
267. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 778 & n. 2 (Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting) ("By
striking the proviso, the majority essentially appropriates money for the precise category
of expensive (and often politically oriented cases) that Congress chose not to fund.") In
addition, the Velazquez ruling may encourage LSCA grantees to challenge other
restrictions among the many placed on the LSC. See id. at 767 (noting that the only
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B. The Solution: A Missed Opportunity
To prevent similar disruptions to congressional programs, the Supreme
Court should have clarified the viewpoint discrimination doctrine's role
in subsidized speech cases when it decided Legal Services Corporation v.
Velazquez.2'6 The Court missed an opportunity by not reversing the
26'Second Circuit's viewpoint discrimination ruling and articulating a
coherent analytical model by which to adjudicate subsidized speech
cases.
1. Clarifying the Viewpoint Discrimination Doctrine's Role in
Subsidized Speech Cases
The Supreme Court could eliminate much of the confusion
surrounding subsidized speech cases by considering the language of the
First Amendment's free speech clause.270 The First Amendment provides
that the government shall not make a law "abridging" the freedom of
2711speech. In Finley, Justice Scalia noted that "abridging" requires ashowing that speech is diminished, contracted, or deprived.272  This
restrictions at issue before the Second Circuit were the lobbying and welfare reform
provisions of the LSCA). In fact, if one interprets the Velazquez opinion to mean that the
"suits-for-benefits" exception discriminates on the basis of viewpoint because it promotes
defenders of the "status quo" over challenges to the "status quo," then courts could strike
down many of the 1996 OCRAA restrictions. See supra Part II.B.2 (suggesting that this
was the Second Circuit's rationale). For example, the "oversight provision" prohibits
funding to those who attempt to "influence the conduct of oversight proceedings of the
[LSC]." OCRAA § 504(a)(5). Under this restriction, the "status quo" or conduct of
[LSC] proceedings is favored over those wanting to "influence" or change the existing
conduct. This restriction is different, according to the court's reasoning, than the lobbying
provision which prohibits attempts "to influence the passage or defeat of any legislation,"
because of the neutral language of "passage or defeat." Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 768
(quoting OCRAA § 504(a)(4) and finding that the restriction prohibits activities seeking
or opposing change). Another example is the Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2996f(b)(11) (1994 & Supp. II 1997), which prohibits using money to provide legal
assistance that is inconsistent with the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997,
42 U.S.C. § 14401. This restriction, under the Velazquez court's reasoning, also promotes
the status quo in using the word "inconsistent." 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(11).
268. 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001).
269. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 772, 773 (concluding that section 504(a)(16) of the
OCRAA is unconstitutional to the extent that it restricts a grantee seeking relief from a
welfare agency from challenging existing laws, and directs the district court to bar
enforcement of the narrow provision within the exception).
270. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.").
271. See id.; see also National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 595
(Scalia, J., concurring).
272. Finley, 524 U.S. at 595 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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necessarily requires looking at the speech at issue, both before and after
the government restriction, to determine whether speech has been
abridged.
Precedent clearly establishes that an unconstitutional conditions
analysis will determine when abridgment occurs.273 In Regan, the Court
emphasized that the case turns on how the "restriction" is
administered."' In subsequent subsidized speech cases, the Supreme
Court appeared to adopt this analysis by asking whether the program
provides adequate alternative channels for protected speech.275
Precedent indicates that the proper test under the unconstitutional
conditions analysis is whether the restriction coerces and penalizes
276
speech or whether it is a mere non-subsidy. The unconstitutional
conditions doctrine appropriately applies this test by looking to see if
adequate alternative channels exist for the otherwise unrestricted
expression.277 If such channels exist then the restrictions do not abridge
speech.278
273. See supra Part L.A (discussing how the unconstitutional conditions doctrine tests
when subsidy restrictions cross the line of non-subsidy and acts as a penalty); see also, e.g.,
Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 145 F.3d 1018, 1024 (91h Cir. 1998) (LASH
III) (using the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to test the constitutionality of the
LSCA restrictions).
274. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 552 (1983) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (recognizing that the lobbying restriction on non-profit organizations alone
violated the First Amendment; but as administered, TWR was able to still lobby through
an affiliate).
275. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984) (LWV)
(citing to Blackmun's concurrence in Regan, but distinguishing that case because in LWV
federal funds could not be segregated from non-federal funds to create an affiliate radio
station for editorializing; thus holding the prohibition on editorializing as an over-inclusive
abridgment of free speech); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194-96 (1991) (citing to
LWV and Regan and dismissing viewpoint discrimination challenges in subsidized speech
cases, which lend support to the proposition that unconstitutional conditions cases turn on
whether the speech condition effectively prohibits a recipient from engaging in protected
conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program).
276. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 198 (citing to LWV and Regan for the proposition that given
an alternative means to speak, Congress does not infringe or regulate any First
Amendment activity); see also Finley, 524 U.S. at 598-99 (Scalia concurring) (recognizing
that "abridging" speech and funding speech is fundamentally distinct).
277. See, e.g., supra Part I.C (discussing the seminal Supreme Court cases endorsing
this analysis).
278. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 197-98; see also LASH III, 145 F.3d at 1026-27 (finding that
the LSCA creates opportunity for affiliate organizations, and, thus, does not violate the
First Amendment). Determining the "adequacy" of alternative channels is a matter of
scrutiny. See generally supra note 32 and accompanying (discussing scrutiny analysis).
LWV exemplifies when the use of scrutiny analysis could lead to a finding of inadequacy.
See, e.g., LWV, 468 U.S. at 400 (analyzing whether federal funds may be segregated from
non-federal funds to create an affiliate radio station for editorializing and finding that
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The unconstitutional conditions analysis forces courts to determine
whether the government is using its spending power as a leverage to
regulate speech."9 Free speech jurisprudence has traditionally required
courts to determine first whether the government is regulating what is
said or focusing on another objective.28°  In other words, if the
government is focused on a non-speech element of communication
rather than on the communication itself, First Amendment protections
may not apply."' Thus, it is important to note that free speech
jurisprudence usually asks first what the government intends to
accomplish with the particular statute and concludes that if the
infringement on speech is secondary, meaning not a direct "abridgment,"
then the First Amendment does not apply.
After determining if the statute is intended to regulate speech, courts
may then use the viewpoint discrimination doctrine to test the
constitutionality of the regulation. The viewpoint discrimination
doctrine ensures that the government does not regulate speech based on
its substantive idea.282 Thus, when Congress intends to create a public
without the ability to segregate the prohibition on editorializing was an over-inclusive
abridgment of free speech).
279. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing how the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine developed to ensure the government does not do something indirectly
it is not able to do directly).
280. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (describing that the
"power to proscribe particular speech on the basis on a noncontent element (e.g. noise)
does not entail the power to proscribe the same speech on the basis of the content
element").
281. See id.
"[N]on-verbal expressive activity can be banned because of the action it entails,
but not because of the ideas it expresses-so that burning a flag in violation of an
ordinance against outdoor fires could be punishable, whereas burning a flag in
violation of an ordinance against dishonoring the flag is not.
Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court justifies time, place, and manner restrictions affecting
speech when there is no reference to the content of speech. See generally, e.g., Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984) (noting the similarity between time, place, and manner
regulations and regulations on non-speech elements).
282. See Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 828-29 (1995) ("Viewpoint
discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The government must
abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or the
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction."). Even in regulating speech
that is not constitutionally protected, the viewpoint discrimination doctrine may ensure
that the regulation applies equally to those wishing to engage in the unprotected speech.
RA.V. describes this utilization in holding unconstitutional a municipal statute that
regulates fighting words-solely on the basis of the type of fighting words at the exclusion
of others. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 382-83 (describing that the First Amendment protects
against content-based regulations and noting the exceptions to be fighting words,
obscenity, and defamation, but qualifying that these exceptions are not necessarily
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forum for speech with federal money, it is easy to justify the use of this
First Amendment protection to test the legality of the conditions on the
type of speech allowed in the forumY23 In the government subsidized
speech context, however, the statute rarely intends to promote diversity
of private speech in a public forum.8 In fact, it is the nature of our
government to enact spending statutes promoting one point of view over
another.285 If viewpoint discrimination is allowed to test the legality of
restrictions on funding outside of when the government's intention is to
regulate speech, it is possible that every government statute could be held
unconstitutional.m6
2. Overturning Velazquez
In applying this analytical model to the LSCA restrictions, the Second
Circuit's ruling in Velazquez, that the "suits-for-benefits" exception was
unconstitutional, should have been overturned. The overriding question
was whether the "suits-for-benefits" exception fulfills the purpose of the
program.2 This required inquiry into the purpose for which Congress
created the Legal Services Corporation. If Congress intended to create a
public forum to promote the diversity of views, then we must analyze
whether the "suits-for-benefits" exception regulates speech directly and,
in doing so, discriminates on the basis of viewpoint. If Congress intended
to advance a purpose other then establishing a public forum, the analysis
turns on whether there are adequate alternative channels for the speech
that the "suits-for-benefits" exception restricts.
a. The Purpose of the LSCA Is To Provide Limited Legal Services to
invisible to constitutional protection).
283. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 826-31 (applying viewpoint discrimination analysis to
test the constitutionality of restrictions on funding for school publications). Restrictions
on which student publications receive funding is a direct control over speech allowed in
the forum and, thus, a regulation of speech. Cf National Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley, 524 U.S. 596, 584-85 (1998) (justifying Rosenberger's use of the viewpoint
discrimination doctrine because the university created a limited public forum).
284. See supra Part I.C (discussing how Rosenberger presents a narrow exception in
subsidized speech cases).
285. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is the very business of
government to favor and disfavor points of view on (in modern times, at least)
innumerable subjects - which is the main reason we have decided to elect those who run
the government, rather than save money by making their posts hereditary.").
286. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1992) ("To hold that the Government
unconstitutionally discriminates on . . .viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program
dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, because in advancing those goals
necessarily discourages alternative goals, would render numerous Government programs
constitutionally suspect").
287. See supra Parts I.C & III.B.
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Indigent Clients
The LSCA states explicitly that the purpose of the LSC is to provide
limited legal services to indigent clients.m The LSCA restrictions show,
overwhelmingly, an intention to prevent grantees from using LSC
funding to challenge or defend the status quo," 9 partake in the political
process of lawmaking," or express their own views over those of their
clients. 9' In no way does the LSCA or the 1996 restrictions reveal
Congress's intent to encourage diverse speech in a public forum. 92
288. See Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (1994) (stating the
purpose of LSC is for "providing financial support for legal assistance in noncriminal
proceedings or matters to persons financially unable to afford legal assistance"); see also
42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(1-11) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) (providing the limitations on the use of
LSC funding); OCRAA Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504(a), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (enacting
more limitations on the use of LSC funding).
289. See, e.g., OCRAA § 504(a)(2) (prohibiting to influence the issuance, amendment,
or revocation of any executive order or administrative agency); id. § 504(a)(3) (prohibiting
attempts to influence judicial proceedings that will have future effect); id. § 504(a)(4)
(prohibiting attempts to influence defeat or passage of legislation); id. § 504(a)(16)
(prohibiting participation in efforts to reform welfare); see also, e.g., supra Part III
(discussing how the "suits-for-benefits" exception prevents LSC funds to be used for
challenging or defending welfare laws).
290. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2996(f)(b)(4) (1994) (funds shall not be used for any political
activities); OCRAA § 504(a)(4) (lobbying provision).
291. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2996(5) ("[T]o preserve its strength, the legal services
program must be kept free from the influence of or use by it of political pressures."); id. §
2996(6) (requiring attorneys to adhere to the Code of Professional Responsibility; Canon
of Ethics; and professional standards); see also, e.g., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(b) (1996) (preventing a lawyer to express his own
view on politics or morals).
292. The Velazquez court never makes the argument that the LSCA creates a public
forum; see supra Part II.B (discussing how the Velaquez court invokes the viewpoint
discrimination doctrine on the type of speech at issue, but not the Rosenberger exception).
The Velaquez court suggests that a courtroom is the most effective forum to articulate an
idea to test the constitutionality of a government rule. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d 757, 772
(2d Cir. 1999) (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958), for the proposition that the
federal judiciary is supreme in the "exposition of the law of the Constitution"). But see id.
at 777 (Jacobs J., concurring and dissenting) (rejecting that the LSCA created the
courtroom as a public forum, especially for the viewpoints of lawyers).
Megan Elizabeth Lewis argues that the LSCA exception creates a limited public
forum and so, applying Rosenberger, viewpoint discriminating restrictions are
unconstitutional. See Lewis, supra note 14, at 1199-1208. The premise is that the
exception establishes a comprehensive lawyer-client relationship, where the client, as a
private individual, speaks through his agent in a limited public forum. See id. at 1199-1203.
Lewis argues that a courtroom is a public forum based on NAACP v. Button and its
progeny. See id. at 1205-06 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963), for the
proposition that litigation is a form of political expression). Along with noting that
litigation is a form of expression, Lewis recognizes that the First Amendment also protects
the right to petition government through the judicial process See id. This lends support to
her contention that the litigation is a public forum. See id. (citing California Motor
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Public forums are those places traditionally open to the public for
expression or those places the government intended to designate as
such.293 When the government creates a limited public forum, it is
entitled to restrict access to preserve the purpose for which the forum
was designated; however, it is not entitled to discriminate on viewpoints
within the forum.294 Nevertheless, the LSCA and the "suits-for-benefits"
exception do not create a limited public forum. For instance, courtrooms
are open to the public, but are not traditional forums for assembly and
debate, as the doctrines of standing and political question illustrate. 5 In
fact, checking our judicial system's ability to declare congressional acts
unconstitutional is a necessary ingredient to our system of separation of
powers.2 6 Neither can it be argued that Congress designated the LSCA
Transportation Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972), which held that
access to the courts is a fundamental First Amendment right). Because litigation is a
public forum, under Lewis's contention, the government may not interfere with the
expression of ideas. See id. at 1207 (analogizing this to Rosenberger).
293. See Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (holding the student
publication system as a government created limited public forum where content-based
restrictions on speech are allowed but not viewpoint discriminating restrictions); Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (finding that a
charity fund drive among public employees, where government limited participation is not
designated nor traditionally a place open to assembly and debate to hold it a public
forum); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (holding
intraschool mail system to be a non-public forum).
294. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (allowing restriction to access by content
discrimination); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
390 (1993) ("[T]here is no question that the [government], like the private owner of
property, may legally preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
dedicated."). Thus, content-based restrictions are permissible, whereas viewpoint based
are not. See Rosenberger 515 U.S. at 829-30 (holding that content based restrictions are
permissible if it preserves the purpose of the forum and viewpoint discrimination is
"presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's
limitations").
295. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 480 (1982) ("Were the federal courts merely publicly
funded forums for the ventilation of public grievances or the refinement of jurisprudential
understanding, the concept of 'standing' would be quite unnecessary. [The standing
requirement] forecloses the conversion of courts of the United States into judicial versions
of college debating forums."); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973) (holding
that an association of law students had standing to sue the ICC for failing to file an
environmental impact statement and noting that the judicial process should not be "a
vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders"); Chicago &
Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892) (discussing that the power to
declare rights of individuals and measure the authority of government "is legitimate only
in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy"); see also generally Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (stating that to
have standing the party must show injury in fact).
296. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473 (recognizing that the exercise of judicial power
affects relationships between the branches of government, which "is, of course, most vivid
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to create a limited public forum, as the LSCA explicitly limits the
purpose of the program to representation for indigents in specific types
of cases. 297
Even if it is assumed arguendo that the "suits-for-benefits" exception
creates a limited pubic forum, the exception is still a permissible content-
based restriction fulfilling the purpose for which the LSCA was
198
enacted. The language of the exception restricts grantees to
representations for eligible clients who seek specific relief.2 9 Like the
class-action prohibition,m this language implies that Congress intended
to limit representation to less expensive benefit-collection suits. In
addition, the exception cin be interpreted to restrict speech challenging
or defending the existing welfare laws; thus, making them analogous to
the lobbying provisions, which the Velazquez court held to be
permissible content-based restrictions.3 °2
when a federal court declares unconstitutional an act of the Legislative or Executive
Branch"); see also generally Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential
Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983) (arguing that
citizens should use the political process to vindicate rights as the courts role is to protect
concrete rights of individuals, not to vindicate the public's interests).
297. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of LSCA).
298. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (allowing content-based restrictions to fulfill the
purpose of the statute); Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 775 (1999) (Jacobs,
J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that the exception does not allow a grantee to take
part in the representation in the first place).
299. See OCRAA Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504(a)(16), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The "suits-
for-benefits" exception provides that the
[P]aragraph shall not be construed to preclude a recipient from representing an
individual eligible client who is seeking specific relief from a welfare agency if such
relief does not involve an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing law in
effect on the date of the initiation of the representation.
Id. (emphasis added).
300. See id. § 504(a)(7).
301. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 778 (Jacobs, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing
that in limiting this expensive litigation, Congress is maximizing the expenditure of limited
available funds). Because, as even the majority conceded, the lawyer-client relationship is
not all-encompassing, the initial grantee's lawyer should indicate at the lawyer-client
meeting that the lawyer might not be able to take the case. See id. at 764-65 (ensuring that
LSC clients should not have any expectation or reliance of an all-encompassing lawyer-
client relationship). In assessing the facts of a denial of benefits, an LSC grantee-lawyer,
who is pressumably well-trained in these types of suits, can probably assess whether it is a
case where a constitutional argument or other challenge to the existing rule is warranted
and put the client on notice of the limited representation. But see id. at 772 & n.9 (arguing
that a lawyer will not know in advance what arguments must be raised). In fact, most legal
organizations have an internal policy to inform their clients that the organization will not
take cases on appeal because of the expense in doing so. Because most constitutional and
statutory challenges will probably be appealed, it is unlikely that a LSC lawyer would
handle the case.
302. See supra Part II.B.2.b (discussing how standing precludes a client from bringing a
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b. LASH III and Velazquez Both Agree That Adequate Alternative
Channels for Speech Exist
Once it is established that Congress's purpose in enacting the LSCA
was not to create a limited public forum, it must be shown that the
restrictions, as applied when considering the whole statute, still allow
grantees adequate alternative channels of expression to overcome the
First Amendment challenge. °3 Although the LASH III and Velazquez
courts differed in their reasoning, both found that the implementing
regulations still provided LSC grantees the opportunity to engage in
speech activities, which the LSCA restricts.3 4 Based on this agreement
and the striking similarity between the LSCA implementing regulations
and those at issue in Rust, it is unfounded that the Supreme Court held
the restrictions as unconstitutionally abridging free speech.
IV. CONCLUSION
When the Government decides to place restrictions on the funds it
disburses, a pool of complex constitutional questions arises. The LSCA's
restrictions raise these questions. The Second Circuit misapplied
precedent to hold a narrow provision within the "suits-for-benefits"
exception impermissible viewpoint discrimination, and in doing so,
opened the floodgates for legal service organizations to challenge welfare
laws and other LSCA restrictions. This is inconsistent with the purpose
of the LSCA and negatively affects the clients these organizations intend
to serve. The Court's affirmation of the Second Circuit's decision is an
egregious mistake. The Court should have limited the viewpoint
discrimination analysis in government funding cases to instances in which
the government is promoting public debate. By doing so, the Supreme
Court would have confined First Amendment protections to those
situations where it promotes the marketplace of ideas. Instead, the
Cour*t allowed the First Amendment to dilute the effect of a
congressional program.
"suits-for-benefits" when the client already received the benefits).
303. See supra Part III.B.1.
304. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 766 (holding that the grantees were not prohibited
from engaging in the otherwise protected activity outside the scope of the LSCA); Legal
Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 145 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9' Cir. 1998) (LASH Il1)
(holding that the regulations allowed for the formation of separate affiliates to engage in
the otherwise protected activity). It is recognized, however, that the plaintiff's could bring
an "as-applied" challenge to the implementing regulations. Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 767.
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